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When Agencies Make Criminal Law
Brenner M. Fissell*
The nondelegation doctrine prohibits a legislature from delegating its power to an
administrative agency, yet it is famously underenforced—even when the delegation results in
the creation of criminal offenses (so-called “administrative crimes”). While this practice
appears to scandalize the hornbook presumption that legislatures alone define criminal
offenses, it has long been ratified by the Supreme Court and has received little scholarly
attention. The few commentators who have addressed administrative crimes highlight the
intuition that criminal sanctions are uniquely severe and thus deserving of a more rigorous
nondelegation analysis, but they stop there. They do not precisely link the severe aspects of
criminal punishment with a requirement for the type of institutions that can create criminal
law. This Article provides that link. I argue that the two most significant dimensions of
criminal punishment—community condemnation and liberty deprivation—implicate the
concerns of two prominent political theories of punishment: expressivism and liberalism. A
latent but mostly unstated premise of both theories, I claim, is that criminalization must be
undertaken by a democratic institution. Given this, administrative crimes should be seen as
illegitimate under either conception of state punishment.
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at the 2018–2019 conference entitled Delegation, Nondelegation, and ‘Un-Delegation’ at the C. Boyden
Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative State, including Jonathan Adler, Kristin Hickman, Paul
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INTRODUCTION
Nondelegation doctrines prohibit a legislature from delegating its power to an
executive branch entity,1 but they are rarely enforced.2 This is true even when the
delegation results in the creation of criminal offenses—a practice at odds with
criminal law’s background presumption of legislative offense definition. While a
leading treatise states “[i]t is for the legislative branch of a state or the federal
government to determine . . . the kind of conduct which shall constitute a crime,”3
administratively created crimes nevertheless proliferate.
These “administrative crimes” appear when an offense created by a legislature
incorporates by reference a rule that is itself determined by an agency. Take for
example the Rules of Conduct for riding on the New York City Subway. The state
legislature created an agency to operate the subway, the New York City Transit
Authority, and delegated to that agency the power “[t]o make, amend and repeal
rules governing the conduct and safety of the public as it may deem necessary,
convenient or desirable for the use and operation of the transit facilities under its
1. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“The nondelegation doctrine is
rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government. The
Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States,’ U.S. Const., Art. I, § 1, and we long have insisted that ‘the integrity and maintenance
of the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally cannot
delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”); Matz v. J.L. Curtis Cartage Co., 7 N.E.2d 220,
224–25 (Ohio 1937) (“It is an accepted doctrine in our constitutional law that the lawmaking
prerogative is a sovereign power conferred by the people upon the legislative branch of the government,
in a state or the nation, and cannot be delegated to other officers, board or commission, or branch of
government. Thus neither the Congress of the United States nor the General Assembly of Ohio can
delegate its legislative power . . . .”).
2. See generally Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (2017) (regarding federal underenforcement of doctrine). For a discussion of
enforcement in state law, which is more mixed, see infra Section III.B.
3. 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 10 (15th ed. 2019).
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jurisdiction.”4 Violation of these rules is punishable by up to ten days incarceration.5
The Authority is controlled by a seventeen-member board, with the members
appointed by the Governor of New York.6 Pursuant to its delegated rulemaking
powers, the Authority has prohibited engaging in certain disorderly conduct (such
as littering or drinking alcohol), possessing weapons, and entering certain restricted
areas.7 The penalty provision elevates this rulemaking by an agency board into a
criminal offense, punishable just as severely as violations of legislatively
determined rules.
Administrative crime like the subway rules are pervasive in American law, and
have an impressive pedigree at the U.S. Supreme Court—despite the Court’s
technical adherence to a nondelegation doctrine. These offenses were first upheld
against a nondelegation challenge in 1911, and an unbroken line of cases since that
time has continued to ratify the practice.8 Emblematic of this status quo is the 1991
decision in Touby v. United States,9 where the Court approved of the regime set up
by the Controlled Substances Act: the Attorney General, not Congress, determined
what drugs would be “scheduled” and thus illegal to manufacture or possess.10 Many
state high courts have taken a similar approach when analyzing their state
constitutions. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has written approvingly
of delegations to agencies (backed by criminal sanctions) relating to topics ranging
from alcohol sales to workplace safety to sanitation.11
A small body of scholarship has criticized administrative crimes, arguing that
these products of legislative delegation should be analyzed differently from the
typical agency regulation. Supporting this objection is the common intuition that
criminal sanctions are uniquely severe—especially in that criminal violations result
in liberty deprivations and in stigmatization of the offender. This intuition is correct,
but undertheorized; it fails to precisely state why these aspects of criminal sanctions
imply limitations on the types of institutions that can or should create criminal law.
That is the goal of this Article.
I will claim that the vast and growing body of administrative crimes is
illegitimate because agencies are an illegitimate source of criminal law. To say that
the legitimacy of criminal laws depends on their source, though, requires a political
theory of punishment—a theory that provides principles by which criminalization
institutions can be assessed. I employ two such theories: expressivism and

4.
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1204 (McKinney 2019).
5.
Id.
6.
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1201, 1263 (McKinney 2019).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.7 (2019).
7.
8.
See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). This was recently reaffirmed in Gundy
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (holding delegation to Attorney General to determine
retroactivity of criminally enforced sex offender registration requirements constitutional). See infra
Section III.B regarding state law.
9.
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
10. Id. at 167.
11. People v. Lowrie, 761 P.2d 778, 782–83 (Colo. 1988).
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liberalism. Together they comprise two of the most prominent and influential
attempts to analyze the political aspects of punishment.12 I unearth from these
theories a background presumption that is mostly unstated: criminalization must be
democratic in its origins. This conclusion proves fatal to the legitimacy of
administrative crimes.
First, consider the so-called “expressive” theory of punishment. The central
insight of expressivism is that criminal punishment involves not just “hard
treatment,” such as imprisonment, but also communicates symbolic condemnation
from the community. Because this condemnation must come from the community,
though, the determination of what conduct merits condemnation must also be a
community decision. Expressivism thus demands democratic criminalization,
meaning that administrative crimes are illegitimate in the eyes of an expressivist.
Since agency decision-makers are not elected by a majority of the members of the
political community, they cannot claim to act on behalf of that community or speak
for it. This deprives what I call “bureaucratic condemnations” of the symbolic
significance that legal punishment requires; only a political majority’s condemnation
decisions carry meaning as the voice of the community itself.
Bureaucratic condemnations are most problematic in the (hopefully) rare cases
when they condemn conduct that a majority of citizens believes to be unworthy of
state condemnation. Agency expertise trumps public will when determining
regulations, yet the administrative crimes promulgated by the agency purport to
condemn offenders in the name of the same community that disapproves of the
offense. This irony reveals the larger legitimacy problem at issue—there is no
necessary connection between public will and criminalization. But this also means
that even when popular will does support a bureaucratic condemnation, say, out of
coincidence, the condemnation is still problematic because it comes from the wrong
source. When a bureaucrat chooses to punish conduct that most people think is
worth condemning, the lucky alignment of bureaucratic and popular will is not
enough to imbue that condemnation with the symbolic significance required of
state punishment.
Next, consider the “liberal” or consent-based theory of punishment. This
theory starts with the premise that human beings are free and equal, and therefore
views state punishment as prima facie illegitimate, given that it involves coercion.
The liberal theory is most concerned with the fact that criminalization results in
liberty restrictions, both through prohibiting acts (and thus deterring people from
engaging in them), and also in incarcerating them if they violate the prohibitions.
Free individuals do not create the state so that it can undermine their freedom,
though, and therefore state punishment can only be reconciled with freedom if the

12. Unlike the dominant moral theories of punishment, retributivism and utilitarianism, I argue
that expressive and liberal theories have necessary implications for the structure of the political
institutions that create criminal law. Retributivism and utilitarianism can accommodate a wide range of
different institutional forms so long as the criminalization institution accurately assesses desert or utility.
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citizen can be thought to constructively consent to it, thereby legitimizing it. Liberal
theory posits that this consent is granted in the expectation of mutual benefit. As
one early liberal thinker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, wrote, “[I]t is in order not to be
the victim of a murderer that a person consents to die if he becomes one.”13 Free
and equal individuals, though, would only constructively consent to political
authority exercised via democratic lawmaking institutions—institutions that accord
respect to individual autonomy and equality. And if this is true of coercive legislation
more generally, it is especially true of criminal offenses backed by violent sanctions.
Thus, liberal theory demands that criminalization institutions be democratic in order
for punishment to be legitimate. This means that administrative crimes cannot
satisfy the “Liberal Principle of Legitimacy”14: free and equal individuals would not
constructively consent to punishment determinations made by bureaucratic agency
leaders on the basis of their claim to expert knowledge.
Expressive and liberal theories of punishment each impose a requirement of
democratic criminalization. Each is therefore an independent and alternative reason
for rejecting the legitimacy of administrative crimes. The claim of this Article is
limited to the legitimacy of these offenses as a matter of political theory, and
therefore does not have a necessary implication for their status in constitutional law.
However, the claim does seem relevant if the Court chooses to engage in a
functionalist analysis of the nondelegation doctrine in future cases. If one accepts
that criminal punishment entails special burdens on citizens such that it may only
be legitimately imposed by a certain institution, then delegations of power from that
institution to institutions of a different character may invite a more probing scrutiny
by the nondelegation doctrine.15 While some may balk at the implications of this
conclusion for the continued existence of the administrative state, this concern is
overblown. Civil penalties, and all their deterrent value, would remain untouched.16
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses examples of administrative
crimes in both federal and state law, and briefly addresses the difficulties in making
a comprehensive assessment of the number of these offenses. Part II explicates the
long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing administrative crimes and the
federal nondelegation doctrine, as well as how important state high courts have
applied their state constitutional law to this issue. Part III reviews the small body of
13. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 64 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith
R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762).
14. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (2005).
15. The Court in Touby indicated that it was at least open to considering this. Touby, 500
U.S. at 165–66 (1991) (“Petitioners suggest, however, that something more than an ‘intelligible
principle’ is required when Congress authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that
contemplate criminal sanctions. They contend that regulations of this sort pose a heightened risk to
individual liberty and that Congress must therefore provide more specific guidance. Our cases are not
entirely clear as to whether more specific guidance is in fact required. We need not resolve the issue
today.”) (citation omitted).
16. After all, many penalty provisions in agency enabling acts give the government the option
of pursuing either civil or criminal charges for the same conduct. See Ryan D. Doerfler, Can a Statute
Have More Than One Meaning?, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 213, 243–47 (2019).
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scholarly literature relevant to administrative crimes and observes that the primary
argument offered against them is the intuition that criminal sanctions are uniquely
severe, and that they therefore demand a stricter nondelegation analysis. Building
on this, Part IV theorizes how the two most severe aspects of criminal punishment
bear on what institution can criminalize conduct—these are the state’s power to
express community condemnation and to deprive individuals of their liberty.
Piecing together strands in both expressivist and liberal punishment theory, this Part
argues that criminalization must be democratic, and that therefore administrative
crimes are illegitimate.
I. EXAMPLES
Before discussing the jurisprudence that has developed regarding
administrative crimes, it is worth discussing some concrete examples and describing
the form of the typical offense. The definition we will use throughout this Article
is that an administrative crime exists, at the very least, whenever a legislature creates
an offense in which an element incorporates by reference a body of rules or
regulations promulgated by an administrative agency. Consider the following
formula: “It shall be an offense to [insert mens rea] violate the regulations
promulgated by the Agency pursuant to this Title.” As this hypothetical statute
suggests, it is usually the act element that incorporates the regulations by reference;
it is the determination of punishable conduct that is the decision delegated to
the Agency.
Consider these examples from federal law:
White Collar Crime. Many agencies regulating business-related
conduct are empowered by statute to promulgate regulations backed
by criminal sanction. For example, the SEC is empowered to create
record retention rules relating to corporate audits, and the statute
giving the agency this power states that “[w]hoever knowingly and
willfully violates . . . any rule or regulation promulgated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission under [this grant of authority],
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.”17
Environmental Protection. Many federal statutes promulgate
administrative crimes relating to environmental protection.18 For
example, the Ocean Dumping Act makes it a criminal offense to
“knowingly violat[e] any provision of this subchapter, [or] any
regulation promulgated under this subchapter.”19

17. 18 U.S.C. § 1520(b) (2018).
18. Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes, 21
ST. MARY’S L.J. 821, 838 (1990).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (2012).
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Food and Drug Law. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits the
“misbranding of any food”20 and provides for up to one-year
imprisonment for violations.21 However, the law also states that
the “definition and standard of identity” that branding must
adhere to is “prescribed by regulations” promulgated by the
presidentially-appointed Secretary of Health and Human Services.22
Entitlement Programs. The statute creating the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (the federal food purchasing assistance program
for low-income households) makes it a criminal offense to “us[e],
transfe[r], acquir[e], alte[r], or posses[s] benefits in any manner
contrary to this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this
chapter.”23 The Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to issue
these regulations.24
Wildlife Conservation. The National Wildlife Refuge System Act, which
protects animals and plants on federal lands, creates a criminal
offense for violations of “any of the provisions of [the] Act or any
regulations issued thereunder.”25
Others. ERISA reporting regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor are backed by criminal sanction,26 as are recordkeeping
regulations governing bank holding companies that are promulgated
by the Federal Reserve Board.27 Regulations covering the navigation
of water vessels, promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation, are
also punishable as criminal offenses.28
Now, consider some examples from state law:
All states operate prisons, and all prisons likely have disciplinary rules
imposed by their administrators on inmates that result in punishment
if violated. While technically these sanctions are called “discipline”
and not criminal punishment, they are effectively the same. Here,
state legislatures have delegated the decision of what conduct to
punish in prisons to the prison administrators. For example, the New
York Commission of the Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision has promulgated the “Standards of Inmate
Behavior” pursuant to this authority.29
20. 21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (2018).
21. Id. § 333(a)(1).
22. Id. §§ 343(g), 341.
23. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (2018).
24. Id. § 2013(c).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(f)(1) (2018).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2012).
27. 12 U.S.C. § 1956 (2018).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 192(a)–(b) (2012).
29. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137(2) (McKinney 2019); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7,
§ 270.2 (2019).
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D.C.’s water pollution law makes it a misdemeanor offense to
“willfully or negligently violate[ ] . . . the regulations promulgated
pursuant to [the water pollution] subchapter.”30
In New York it is a misdemeanor to commit a “tax fraud act,” by
failing to “file any return or report required under this chapter or any
regulation promulgated under this chapter.”31
Florida’s law creating a public teacher retirement system states: “Any
person subject to the terms and provisions of this chapter, including
the individual members of all boards, who shall violate any of the
provisions of this chapter or any valid rule or regulation promulgated
under authority of the chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
second degree.”32
Texas oil and gas law states: “[A] person who violates any of the rules
or orders of the governmental agency adopted under the provisions
of this chapter on conviction is considered guilty of a felony.”33
It is difficult to assess how numerous these administrative crimes
are—especially in federal law. Prominent scholars, as well as the House Judiciary
Committee, have circulated an estimate of 300,000, but the foundations of this
estimate are questionable.34 In 1998, the ABA’s Task Force on the Federalization
of Criminal Law lamented that “[s]o large is the present body of federal criminal law

30. D.C. Code Ann. § 8-103.16(a)(1) (West 2019).
31. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1801(a)(1), 1802 (McKinney 2019).
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 238.16 (West 2019).
33. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 88.134(b) (West 2019).
34. See Press Release, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., House Judiciary
Comm. Reauthorizes Bipartisan Over-Criminalization Task Force (Feb. 5, 2014), https://
republicans-judiciary.house.gov/press-release/house-judiciary-committee-reauthorizes-bipartisanover-criminalization-task-force [ https://perma.cc/N73R-P5MB ] (“[S]tudies put the number at more
than 300,000 – many of which, if violated, can also result in criminal liability.”). Well-known expert in
white collar crime, Professor Julie O’Sullivan, also testified to this number before the House Judiciary
Committee and used the number in a law review article. See Criminal Code Reform: Hearing Before the
Over-Criminalization Task Force of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 63 (2014)
(“Ms. O’SULLIVAN. Exactly. We do not know what the content yet is. But more seriously, I do not
think anybody is going to count the number of criminalized regulatory offenses. I think at last count
there were 300,000. That strikes me as crazy.”); Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal
“Code”: Return of Overfederalization, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 58 (2014) (“Some estimate that
federal agencies have generated hundreds of thousands of criminally-enforceable regulations.”).
O’Sullivan’s citation for this number in turn relies on the prominent environmental law scholar Richard
Lazarus. Id. at 58 n.7. Lazarus states that “[a]n estimated 300,000 federal regulations are now subject
to criminal enforcement.” Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2441–42 (1995).
Lazarus’s source is John Coffee. Id. at 2442 n.168. Coffee bases his estimate on comments “made by
Stanley Arkin, a well-known practitioner in the field of white collar crime, at the George Mason
Conference in October 1990.” John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 216 n.94 (1991). The
source of Arkin’s claim is unknown. Thus, the oft-cited estimate of 300,000 administrative crimes has
no verifiable basis.
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that there is no conveniently accessible, complete list of federal crimes.”35 The
complexity of recognizing administrative crime provisions outside of the general
criminal law title (Title 18) was a major reason for this inability to make an accurate
accounting: “A large number of sanctions are dispersed throughout the thousands
of administrative ‘regulations’ promulgated by the various governmental agencies
under Congressional statutory authorization. Nearly 10,000 regulations mention
some sort of sanction, many clearly criminal in nature, while many others are
designated ‘civil.’”36 While a precise count has not been ascertained, what no one
disagrees about is that the number of administrative crimes is substantial.
Administrative regulations backed by criminal sanctions cover wide ranges of
conduct and multiply in the background through the rulemaking process.
II. JUDICIAL RECEPTION
A. Federal Law
The seminal case addressing the validity of administrative crimes is the 1918
U.S. Supreme Court decision of United States v. Grimaud.37 Grimaud involved a
conviction “for grazing sheep on the Sierra Forest Reserve without having obtained
the permission required by the regulations adopted by the Secretary of
Agriculture.”38 A federal statute had delegated rulemaking authority to the Secretary
and made violations of those rules criminal offenses.39 The Court noted that the
general purpose of the statute was to protect and manage forest reservations, but
that the choice of whether a specific reservation would allow a specific activity was
merely a “matter of administrative detail,” as “it was impracticable for Congress to
provide general regulations for these various and varying details of management”
given the “peculiar and special features” of each reservation.40 The Court wrote that
by empowering the Secretary to adapt his regulations to “local conditions,”
“Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not
delegating to him legislative power.”41 The Court referred to an older case involving
court rules and stated that while “strictly and exclusively legislative” powers could
not be delegated, “nonlegislative” powers to “fill up the details” of a statute were

35. James A. Strazzella, Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. 9, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
criminaljustice/Federalization_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf [ https://perma.cc/8SFY-67UB ]
( last visited Dec. 28, 2019 ).
36. Id. at 9–10.
37. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
38. Id. at 514.
39. Id. at 515 (“[T]he Secretary ‘may make such rules and regulations and establish such service
as will insure the objects of such reservations; namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to
preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules
and regulations shall be punished.’”).
40. Id. at 516.
41. Id.
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permissibly delegated.42 Exclusively legislative powers were “important subjects,”
but those subjects of “less interest”—the “details”—were the province of
administrative regulations.43
While the initial justification for the delegation appears to be variability (in this
case, the peculiar features of different reservations), in the end variability of
circumstances represents just one species of a larger category: the “details.” Grimaud
continues by giving other examples of mere “details”: ratemaking in shipping and
determining the uniform height of railroad-car couplings.44 The determination of
details like these “administer the law and carry the statute into effect.”45 Later the
concept is described in more depth, when the Court quotes from some prior
delegation cases outside of the criminal context: Congress may delegate “a power
to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to
make its own action depend,” as “there are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power.”46
“Details” are “known unknowns” at the time of the legislative enactment, and their
specification effectuates the legislative intent.
After Grimaud, the coming of the New Deal and the rise of the administrative
state would result in a greatly increased number of administrative crimes as the 20th
century progressed.47 The Grimaud holding would remain undisturbed at the
Supreme Court, though.48
One flicker of dissent emerged from Justice Brennan in his concurrence in the
1967 case United States v. Robel.49 Robel involved a conviction pursuant to the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, which prohibited any member of a
Communist organization from “engag[ing] in any employment in a defense
facility.”50 The determination of what constituted a “defense facility” was delegated
to the Secretary of Defense.51 The Court struck down the offense on freedom of

42. Id. at 517.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 517–18.
45. Id. at 518.
46. Id. at 520.
47. For a discussion of this era and criminal lawmaking, see generally Mila Sohoni, Notice and
the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2013).
48. A case that is exemplary of this era is the 1944 decision in Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944). In Yakus, the defendants were convicted of selling beef above the maximum
price regulation specified by the “Price Administrator,” and these regulations were backed by a criminal
sanction pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act. Id. at 418. This was an emergency regulatory
regime passed during the height of World War II and was set to expire on its own terms by mid-1944.
Id. at 419–20. In upholding the law, the Court took note of the fact that these regulations had criminal
sanctions, but this feature seemed to be of no import: “The essentials of the legislative function are the
determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding
rule of conduct—here the rule, with penal sanctions . . . will tend to further the policy which Congress
has established.” Id. at 424. The “penal sanctions” clause of that sentence seems to be an afterthought.
49. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 273–74 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 259–60.
51. Id. at 260.
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association grounds, but Justice Brennan’s concurrence raised the additional issue
of the Secretary’s role in determining criminal liability.52 Brennan, of course, was no
opponent of the administrative state, and began his opinion by re-affirming his
belief that lax enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine was generally
appropriate.53 The difference in this case, though, was that the Secretary effectively
defined administrative crimes.54 What makes criminal sanctions unique is their
especially harsh effect of liberty deprivation: “[T]he numerous deficiencies
connected with vague legislative directives,” Brennan wrote, “are far more serious
when liberty and the exercise of fundamental rights are at stake.”55
This special aspect of the criminal sanction meant that it should only be
imposed by a legislature—only after “legislative judgment” on “formulation of
policy.”56 The problem with delegated policy formulation is that policy formulation
is “entrusted to [Congress] by the electorate,” and that administrative agencies are
“often not answerable or responsive in the same degree to the people,” and
therefore they lack the “authority” to decide such questions.57 Congress is the
“appropriate forum where conflicting pros and cons should have been presented
and considered.”58 Brennan’s vision of legislative judgment is thus grounded in
democratic legitimacy through electoral accountability (“authority”), with the
acknowledgement that many decisions will have competing reasons for different
actions (“pros and cons”) requiring democratic deliberation.59

52. Id. at 261; see also id. at 272 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. See id. at 274 (“No other general rule would be feasible or desirable. Delegation of power
under general directives is an inevitable consequence of our complex society, with its myriad, ever
changing, highly technical problems.”).
54. See id. at 275 (“The area of permissible indefiniteness narrows, however, when the regulation
invokes criminal sanctions and potentially affects fundamental rights, as does [this law].”).
55. Id.; see also id. at 277 (“The need for a legislative judgment is especially acute here, since it is
imperative when liberty and the exercise of fundamental freedoms are involved that constitutional rights
not be unduly infringed.”).
56. Id. at 282. Brennan also raised a form of a notice rationale. United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 281 (1967) (“Third. The indefiniteness of the delegation in this case also results in inadequate
notice to affected persons. Although the form of notice provided for in s 5(b) affords affected persons
reasonable opportunity to conform their behavior to avoid punishment, it is not enough that persons
engaged in arguably protected activity be reasonably well advised that their actions are subject to
regulation. Persons so engaged must not be compelled to conform their behavior to commands, no
matter how unambiguous, from delegated agents whose authority to issue the commands is unclear
. . . . The legislative directive must delineate the scope of the agent’s authority so that those affected by
the agent’s commands may know that his command is within his authority and is not his own arbitrary
fiat . . . . There is no way for persons affected by s 5(a)(1)(D) to know whether the Secretary is acting
within his authority, and therefore no fair basis upon which they may determine whether or not to risk
disobedience in the exercise of activities normally protected.”).
57. Id. at 276.
58. Id.
59. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275–77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Such
congressional determinations will not be assumed. ‘They must be made explicitly not only to assure that
individuals are not deprived of cherished rights under procedures not actually authorized . . . but also
because explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and purposeful
consideration by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws.’”). Consider also this
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Despite Brennan’s arguments, the consensus on administrative crimes was not
even called into question by the Court until almost twenty-five years later. In 1991,
co-defendants challenged the scheme created by the Controlled Substances Act in
Touby v. United States.60 The Act established five categories of substances and
punished unauthorized manufacture, possession, and distribution of these
substances, but authorized the Attorney General to add or remove substances from
the various categories.61 The Attorney General in turn delegated his authority to the
Drug Enforcement Administration’s administrator.62 The defendants in the case
challenged these delegations as unconstitutional, arguing that the nondelegation
doctrine requires greater statutory specificity with respect to prohibited conduct
when the regulations promulgated under the statute carry criminal sanctions.63 The
Court did not outright reject this claim. Instead, citing Grimaud, the Court
acknowledged that its cases “[a]re not entirely clear as to whether more specific
guidance” is required for regulations that function as criminal offenses, but that
“even if greater congressional specificity is required in the criminal context,” the
Controlled Substances Act is sufficiently specific.64 Crucial to this determination
was that the Act imposed daunting procedural requirements on the Attorney
General’s power to add and remove substances from the restricted categories.65
These “specific restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretion” saved the
Controlled Substances Act from unconstitutionality,66 despite the fact that the
restrictions on the discretion were purely procedural. Congress did not define or limit
what is or is not an unlawful substance.
Justice Marshall’s concurrence (joined by Blackmun) in Touby indicates that
despite his vote, he was somewhat troubled by administrative crimes.67 For
Marshall, judicial review of the Agency’s decision was crucial to the constitutionality
of the Controlled Substances Act’s delegation due to its criminal nature:
Because of the severe impact of criminal laws on individual liberty . . . an
opportunity to challenge a delegated lawmaker’s compliance with
congressional directives is a constitutional necessity when administrative
standards are enforced by criminal law . . . . We must therefore read the
Controlled Substances Act as preserving judicial review of a temporary

passage from Justice Brennan’s opinion in a 1984 void-for-vagueness case: “The requirement that
government articulate its aims with a reasonable degree of clarity ensures that state power will be
exercised only on behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social
values . . . .” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984).
60. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 167 (1991).
61. Id. at 162.
62. Id. at 164.
63. Id. at 162.
64. Id. at 166.
65. Id. at 167 (“It is clear that in §§ 201(h) and 202(b) Congress has placed multiple specific
restrictions on the Attorney General’s discretion to define criminal conduct. These restrictions satisfy
the constitutional requirements of the nondelegation doctrine.”).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 169–70.
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scheduling order in the course of a criminal prosecution in order to save
the Act’s delegation of lawmaking power from unconstitutionality.68
For Marshall, like for Brennan, the especially harsh effects of criminalization
(liberty deprivation) justified a different analysis than did the typical delegation case,
yet for Marshall it was not legislative specificity that saved these laws, but
judicial review.
While Touby seemed to have been an expression of a potential need for greater
specificity in criminal delegations, only five years later these concerns evaporated.
In the 1996 case of Loving v. United States, a criminal defendant challenged the
President’s power to specify aggravating factors for military capital punishment
pursuant to a Congressional delegation.69 In the opinion the Court explicitly
re-affirmed the validity of administrative crimes, and cited to Grimaud:
There is no absolute rule . . . against Congress’ delegation of authority to
define criminal punishments. We have upheld delegations whereby the
Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct
will be criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a
criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations “confin[e]
themselves within the field covered by the statute.”70
Loving interprets Grimaud quite expansively, and as imposing only two
requirements. The penalty must be in the statutory text, and the regulations must
be inside the “field covered” by that text. While Grimaud spoke of agencies “fill[ing]
up the details” that would be “unknown” at the time of legislative deliberation but
necessary to “carry the statute into effect,” Loving views statutes as creating a “field”
within which regulations were free to operate.71

68. Id. at 170.
69. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). Loving is different from the previous cases in
two respects. First, it is a delegation with respect to sentencing and not substantive criminal liability.
Moreover, it is a delegation to the President, and not to one of his or her executive agencies.
70. Id. at 754 (citing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)).
71. The quote from Grimaud referencing this “field” comes from the discussion in that case of
prior decisions upholding non-criminal administrative delegations.
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For over twenty years after Loving there was little attention paid to the issue
of administrative crimes,72 but in 2019 the Court decided Gundy v. United States.73
In Gundy the petitioner challenged the delegations to the Attorney General in the
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act,74 which empowered that official
to determine the retroactivity of registration requirements that were backed by
criminal sanctions.75 The plurality opinion avoided the constitutional issue by
reading into the statute an “intelligible principle” that saved it from
invalidation—that the Attorney General should register “pre-Act offenders as soon
as feasible.”76 The criminal nature of the regulatory delegation was barely mentioned
by the plurality, and Touby was not cited.77
However, three justices agreed that the statute violated the nondelegation
doctrine, with Justice Gorsuch writing the dissent.78 The dissenters, like the
plurality, analyzed the issue as one of delegated lawmaking more generally; they did
not make explicit their agreement with Touby’s suggestion that administrative crimes
might be a special case requiring stricter standards.79 For the dissenters, all
72. One brief discussion occurs in a 2014 statement respecting the denial of a certiorari petition,
written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas. Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003, 1004
(2014) (mem.). In the case, Scalia criticized the lower court for giving Chevron deference to the SEC’s
interpretation of “fraud” in the federal criminal code, arguing that this “collide[s] with the norm that
legislatures, not executive officers, define crimes.” Id. at 1004. However, while Scalia argued that this
principle militated against deference, it did not rule out administrative criminalization: “Undoubtedly
Congress may make it a crime to violate a regulation . . . .” Id. But if the animating principle behind the
no-deference-in-criminal-law rule is similarly the principle that only legislatures “define crimes,” then
Scalia ought not have concluded that Grimaud-type delegations are “undoubtedly” constitutional. Why
is it worse to accord an agency deference when it interprets a legislatively specified offense element than
it is for the legislature to import wholesale the offense elements created by administrative rule? This
distinction seems empty and formalistic. In both cases, the jury will be instructed on, and the
prosecution must prove, elements that are not legislatively determined. In fact, for delegation purposes
the Whitman-type deference delegation seems less egregious than the Grimaud-type rule-incorporation
delegation—in the case of the former, the legislature has more precisely spoken regarding the elements
of the offense. For another discussion of this issue by a well-regarded circuit judge, see Carter
v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 731 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“By giving
unelected commissioners and directors and administrators carte blanche to decide when an ambiguous
statute justifies sending people to prison, the government’s theory diminishes this ideal.”).
73. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2123.
77. Id. at 2116.
78. Id. at 2131.
79. Id. at 2133. Perhaps it is best to characterize the dissent as viewing criminal law delegations
as the worst of a category that is unconstitutional more generally—not unconstitutional specifically
because of its criminal sanctions. The dissenters seem most concerned with the fact that the delegation
is made to a criminal law enforcement agent (the Attorney General), not that a violation of the AG’s
regulations is a criminal offense. “The Constitution promises that only the people’s elected
representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty. Yet the statute before us scrambles that
design. It purports to endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal
code governing the lives of a half-million citizens.” Id. at 2131; see also id. at 2144–45 (“To allow the
nation’s chief law enforcement officer to write the criminal laws he is charged with enforcing—to
‘unit[e]’ the ‘legislative and executive powers . . . in the same person’—would be to mark the end of any
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delegations, no matter the sanction, were unconstitutional. Their argument—based
on an original understanding of separation of powers—was buttressed by
functionalist claims validating the wisdom of that understanding. Lawmaking
should be “difficult” because impediments to legislation: (1) “limit the
government’s capacity to restrict people’s freedoms,” (2) “promote deliberation,”
(3) “guard unpopular minorities from the tyranny of the majority,” (4) maintain “a
relatively stable and predictable set of rules,” and (5) “ensure that the lines of
accountability would be clear.”80 Of these justifications, (1), (3), and (4) seem most
salient for criminal laws, but the connection is not made explicit in the opinion.
The federal position on administrative crimes, and on delegation more
generally, may change in the future. Justice Alito’s concurrence in Gundy indicated
that he would be willing to “reconsider the approach” the Court has taken on
nondelegation claims if “a majority of this Court were [also] willing.”81 With the
addition of Justice Kavanaugh to the Court, the Grimaud consensus may be
threatened. For now, though, it remains.
B. State Law
Having assessed the state of the law with respect to the federal nondelegation
doctrine, we now turn to the positions of state courts interpreting state constitutions
or statutes. Fortunately, we need not break new ground. Jim Rossi undertook an
exhaustive survey of state nondelegation doctrines in 1999; given all that has been
said in the previous section, his results were surprising.82 The majority of state high
courts have not followed the Supreme Court’s lax interpretation of nondelegation.
Overall, Rossi concludes that “in the states, unlike the federal system, the
nondelegation doctrine is alive and well.”83
Rossi identifies only six states that are, like the federal jurisdiction, “weak”
nondelegation states that “uphold[ ] legislative delegations as long as the Agency has
adequate procedural safeguards in place” (think Touby).84 These can be contrasted
with twenty “strong” nondelegation states where “statutes are periodically struck on

meaningful enforcement of our separation of powers and invite the tyranny of the majority that follows
when lawmaking and law enforcement responsibilities are united in the same hands.”) (citations
omitted). According to this logic, it would be less egregious for Congress to delegate criminal
rulemaking power to, say, the EPA Administrator, with violations then prosecuted by the DOJ.
80. Id. at 2133–35.
81. Id. at 2131.
82. Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers
Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (1999). Rossi’s remains the most current assessment.
83. Id. at 1189. He notes that this is true from the standpoint of the law in 1999. Rossi’s
assessment of the causes of this is interesting. He attributes the difference between the state and federal
systems to be due to the “unique institutional design of state systems of governance.” Id. at 1217. “State
legislatures, and often agencies, are more prone to faction than the U.S. Congress or federal agencies,
both because the costs of organizing and mobilizing local factions are lower and because state
legislatures, in session for very limited terms, are not as effective as Congress at oversight.” Id. at
1227–28.
84. Id. at 1191.

First to Printer_Fissell (Do Not Delete)

870

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/17/2020 7:28 AM

[Vol. 10:855

nondelegation grounds.”85 These strong nondelegation states “differ both in
doctrine and in enforcement from their federal counterparts.”86 In these states the
doctrine is actually enforced, and the doctrine itself often stems from explicit textual
requirements in the state constitution. As Rossi notes, “The overwhelming majority
of modern state constitutions contain a strict separation of powers clause,” meaning
that there is explicit constitutional text dividing power between the various
branches, and also a provision that “instructs that one branch is not to exercise the
powers of any of the others.”87 In “strong” nondelegation states, this text is
operative and is enforced by the state high court; the result is a requirement of
“specific standards and guidelines in legislation to validate a delegation of legislative
authority to an agency.”88
Somewhere between the strong and weak nondelegation states are what Rossi
calls the “moderate” nondelegation states.89 These twenty-three states “vary the
degree of standards necessary depending on the subject matter of the statute or the
scope of the statutory directive,” but rarely uphold delegations solely on the basis
of “procedural safeguards.”90 Rossi writes that while some of these state courts have
adopted doctrinal language similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, the state courts are
“much more likely to strike down statutes as unconstitutional.”91 Similarities in
doctrine belie differences in enforcement levels.92
Before moving on, it is worth looking at some examples of the different
positions that states have taken. In what follows, consider representative opinions
from state high courts—one, from a weak nondelegation state approving
administrative crimes, and a second from a strong nondelegation state reaching the
opposite conclusion.
1. Arizona: Weak Nondelegation
One example of a “weak” nondelegation state, similar to the federal system, is
Arizona.93 In the 1978 case State v. Williams, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld a

85. Id. at 1196–97. While Rossie lists Arizona as a strong nondelegation state, I believe that this
must be a typographical error. He cites to the case discussed below as exemplifying Arizona’s approach,
but as should be apparent, this case endorses broad delegations.
86. Id. at 1197.
87. Id. at 1190.
88. Id. at 1195.
89. Id. at 1198.
90. Id. at 1198–200.
91. Id. at 1200.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., People v. Turmon, 340 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Mich. 1983) (“[T]he power to define
crimes, unlike some legislative powers, need not be exercised exclusively and completely by the
Legislature. Provided sufficient standards and safeguards are included in the statutory scheme,
delegation to an executive agency is appropriate, and often necessary, for the effectuation of
legislative powers.”).
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conviction for an administratively defined crime relating to food stamp fraud.94 The
defendant falsely claimed that she was unemployed so as to keep receiving the food
stamps, in violation of regulations of the State’s Department of Economic Security,
an administrative agency.95 Violation of the Agency’s regulations was made a
misdemeanor by statute: “Whoever knowingly . . . acquires . . . food stamps . . . in
any manner not authorized by law is guilty of a misdemeanor.”96 “Authorized by
law” was interpreted to include regulations promulgated by the Department.97
The court began its analysis by noting the Arizona constitution’s general
approach to nondelegation questions, which is similarly permissive like the federal
approach. “Delegation of ‘quasi-legislative’ powers to administrative agencies,
authorizing them to make rules and regulations, within proper standards fixed by
the legislature, are normally sustained as valid,” the court reasoned, “and, barring a
total abdication of their legislative powers, there is no real constitutional prohibition
against the delegation of a large measure of authority to an administrative agency
for the administration of a statute enacted pursuant to a state’s police power.”98
Only “total abdication” presents a state constitutional law problem. Interestingly,
though, the court views this statute as avoiding a delegation problem altogether:
It should be noted that [the statute] does not delegate any power
whatsoever in the sense of authorizing another governmental body to
create rules or regulations. Rather, the [statute] merely incorporates into
the criminal law of Arizona, by the process of providing penalties for their
violation, rules and regulations of various governmental agencies.99
The court saw a distinction between delegating power to create criminal
offenses and assigning a criminal sanction to a rule created by a non-criminal-law
delegation. While this seems purely formalistic, the opinion does contain strains of
a functionalist justification for this deferential approach: “[a]pparently on the theory
that the Legislature exercises complete dominion over its own agencies, it has long
been established that the Legislature is empowered to provide criminal sanctions
for violations of any legitimate rule or regulation . . . that it has otherwise authorized
the agency to promulgate.”100 Thus, the continuing oversight of the Legislature
justifies the delegation; legislative inaction is effectively acquiescence, given the
Legislature’s ability to reverse agency action.

94.
State v. Williams, 583 P.2d 251, 252 (Ariz. 1978); see also State v. Alfonso, 753 So.2d 156
(La. 1999).
95.
Williams, 583 P.2d at 252.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 254.
99.
Id.
100. Id. at 255 (citing State v. Anklam, 31 P.2d 888 (Ariz. 1934); State v. Phelps, 467 P.2d 923
(Ariz. Ct. App.1970)).
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2. Florida: Strong Nondelegation
Now, consider a more recent opinion from a strong nondelegation
state—Florida.101 In B.H. v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida assessed the validity
of a criminal offense punishing “[a]n escape from any secure [juvenile] detention
facility or any residential commitment facility of restrictiveness level [six] or
above.”102 The restrictiveness level of a facility was then delegated to the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, an administrative agency.103 The
only limits placed on the Agency’s discretion to determine a facility’s restrictiveness
was that the categories must be based on “the risk and needs of the individual child,”
and that there could be no more than eight categories.104
The Florida Supreme Court struck down this offense on nondelegation
grounds.105 In its discussion of federal nondelegation law, the court cited to
Grimaud, as well as a number of law review articles.106 The Florida court summarized
the scholarly consensus on the state of federal law to be one of “stern[ ]”
“critici[sm],” and highlighted seminal figures in intellectual history (Locke and
Montesquieu) who posited the value of the separation of legislative and executive
powers.107 Having criticized the federal approach to nondelegation, the court turned
to Florida law and began with a recognition of a “‘strict’ separation” provision in
the state constitution:
Pursuant to their inherent powers, the people of Florida have established
a tripartite separation of powers precisely like that envisioned by Locke and
Montesquieu: “The powers of the state government shall be divided into
legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly
provided herein.” Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. (emphasis added).108

101. See e.g., People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 410 (Colo. 1998) (“‘It is a fundamental principle
that only the General Assembly may declare an act to be a crime and that power may not be delegated
to persons not elected by nor responsible to the People . . . .’ We carefully scrutinize a statutory scheme
that establishes criminal penalties for violation of administrative rules because such a delegation
implicates an important liberty interest, including the right to reasonable notice of that conduct deemed
criminal . . . . A statute must prescribe standards sufficient to guide and to circumscribe an
administrative officer’s authority to declare conduct criminal.”) (quoting People v. Lepik, 629 P.2d
1080, 1082 (Colo. 1982)); Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 104 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Neb. 1960) (“[The public]
may properly assume that crimes and punishment are purely a legislative function and that the
definition of all crimes and the punishment therefor[e] will be found in the duly enacted statutes of this
state. The public may properly rely on the fact that the Legislature meets only at stated intervals and
that criminal laws may be enacted, amended, and repealed only during such legislative sessions.”).
102. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 989 (Fla. 1994).
103. Id. at 989–90.
104. Id. at 994.
105. Id. at 987.
106. Id. at 990.
107. Id. at 991.
108. Id.
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This textual distinction from the U.S. Constitution provided Florida with a
basis for “expressly and repeatedly” repudiating the U.S. Supreme Court’s
nondelegation jurisprudence.109
According to the Florida court, nondelegation concerns are at their apex in
criminal law matters—these involve authority of a “different magnitude” from a
typical delegation.110 This is because “the power to create crimes and punishments
in derogation of the common law inheres solely in the democratic processes of the
legislative branch,” and also because due process in criminal law requires notice of
prohibited acts.111 The upshot of these principles is that
all challenged delegations in the criminal context must expressly or tacitly
rest on a legislatively determined fundamental policy; and the delegations also
must expressly articulate reasonably definite standards of implementation
that do not merely grant open-ended authority, but that impose an actual
limit—both minimum and maximum—on what the agency may do.112
The statute authorizing HRS to determine restrictiveness levels failed this test,
as it provided no limits on the Agency’s discretion. The Florida Supreme Court
thought it was especially problematic that the Agency appeared to be using its
discretion to game the statutory system: HRS did not create 8 restrictiveness levels
as it was empowered to do so, but instead created four levels “using only even
numbers,” resulting in “2 (nonresidential), 4 (low-risk residential), 6 (moderate-risk
residential), and 8 (high-risk residential).”113 The court appeared to be scandalized
by the ability of the Agency to simply skip odd numbers in a way that affected
whether the offense definition (above “VI”) was triggered or not: “the fact that
HRS skipped odd numbers indicates that the agency felt it could have adopted
virtually any numbering system it chose,” and had it wanted to “HRS might have
designated the four levels respectively as 10, 20, 30, and 40,” thus including all
facilities within the statutory definition.114 The statute here is especially odd in that
it references a numerical category of restrictiveness, but provides no guidance or
limits on whether that number will be adopted within the numbering scheme chose
by the Agency.
In re B.H. provides an excellent example of a strong nondelegation state
enforcing its doctrine in the context of criminal law. The Florida Supreme Court
drew on a concern for democratic decision-making through legislative enactments,
as well as the notice values demanded by due process.

109. Id. at 992.
110. Id. at 993.
111. Id. at 992 (quoting Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. 1991)) (first citing Jeffries
v. State, 610 So. 2d 440, 411 (Fla. 1992); and then citing Perkins v. State, 576 So. 2d 1310, 1312
(Fla. 1991)).
112. B.H., 645 So. 2d at 994.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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III. SCHOLARLY RECEPTION
As we have seen, administrative crimes have an established place in federal
constitutional law, and also in the jurisprudence of some states. The impressive
pedigree of administrative crimes at the U.S. Supreme Court, though, has not
immunized them from criticism. But this literature is relatively small.115
Perhaps the first scholarly response to administrative crimes came in
1943—before the expansive conception of nondelegation took on its canonical
status. German scholar Edmund Schwenk noted the rising trend in the creation of
administrative crimes and wrote an apologetic defense of their use.116 Schwenk
observed that administrative crimes seemed different from typical crimes as they
were “not the outbirth of a particular unmoral conduct, but [were] characterized by
disobedience to administrative duties,” and that the “function” of these offenses
was “deterrence rather than retribution.”117 Because this is punishment “not to
vindicate past conduct, but to enforce future conduct,” administrative crimes had
“nothing to do with the ordinary concept of crime.”118
However, he does not back down from the conceptualization of these offenses
as truly penal.119 Schwenk is aware of the most obvious critique of such a
practice—that “[t]he power of creating either the elements or the penalty of a crime
results in more serious consequences for the individual than the power to issue rules
and regulations which are vested merely with civil or administrative liability.”120 This
critique he dismisses in cryptic fashion: “Th[is] argument . . . is of a psychological
rather than legal nature.”121
It would be over thirty years before the next sustained scholarly assessment of
administrative crimes—a 1976 article by Harlan Abrahams and John Snowden.122

115. This is curious given the extremely vast body of commentary on the nondelegation
doctrine more generally. As Rachel Barkow has observed, criminal law has not received much attention
in debates about separation of powers: “[S]cholars have failed to treat criminal law as a separate category
for analysis. Instead, questions involving the oversight of the administrative and regulatory state have
tended to dominate the discussion . . . .” Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law,
58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 993 (2006).
116. Edmund H. Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by
Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L. REV. 51 (1943).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 86.
119. Id. (“Even though punishment as an administrative sanction should be employed, there
always would remain a proper field for the use of the administrative crime as a penal sanction.”).
120. Id. at 52.
121. Id. at 54.
122. Harlan S. Abrahams & John R. Snowden, Separation of Powers and Administrative
Crimes: A Study of Irreconcilables, 1 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1976). Consider their helpful typology:
Accordingly, the following five types of cases are analyzed: (A) those where the agency is
allowed to determine in the first instance whether violations of its regulations should be
sanctioned criminally; (B) those where the legislature assigns rulemaking power to agencies
and itself provides criminal sanctions for violation of the rules, enforceable by judicial
process; (C) those where the statute not only declares violation of administrative rules to be
criminal, but also empowers the agencies to fix by regulation the amount of the fines within
statutory limits; (D) those where the statute sets forth the sanction generally but delegates
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While Schwenk’s defense came during the heyday of the expansion of the
administrative state, Abrahams and Snowden were writing after the rise of agency
capture theory; their assessment was, perhaps predictably, less positive.123 Overall,
Snowden and Abrahams’ critique seems to be a formalist one. They emphasize that
a paradigmatic function of a branch must be performed by that branch in order for
the action to have “the requisite degree of legitimacy,” but do not explain what they
mean by legitimacy.124 However, they briefly nod towards the criticism that
highlights the distinctive severity of the criminal sanction: “[O]nly in connection
with [a criminal] proceeding will [an offender’s] status as a wrongdoer invoke certain
attitudinal values of the community.”125
A 1992 student note by Mark Alexander addressed the issue of administrative
crimes, but in the context of determining the appropriate level of judicial deference
when reviewing the Agency’s criminal rulemaking.126 In arguing for the need for
heightened scrutiny of criminal agency rules, though, Alexander grounds his analysis
in the distinctive nature of criminal sanctions more generally: “The criminal penalty
represents the ultimate governmental intrusion on individual freedom, together
with a sense of community approbation not present in other government action.”127
Last to consider is a very recent commentary offered by A.J. Kritikos.128
Drawing on the arguments employed by then-Judge Gorsuch in a Tenth Circuit
case, as well as the Florida Supreme Court in In re B.H., Kritikos proposes that the
non-delegation doctrine be “resuscitated” in the criminal context.129 The reasons
for this are unsurprising, and he repeats arguments discussed above regarding the
severity of criminal sanctions. There is a “special need to protect citizens from
arbitrary power when their life and liberty are at stake,” he writes, and “the stakes
of getting the law right are . . . high” with criminal punishment.130 Later, he
reiterates that “separation of powers principles . . . are especially vital to
governmental legitimacy when life and personal liberty are at stake.”131 Because
criminal punishment is “the most significant power wielded by the State,” the state’s
“authority to enforce criminal penalties should be entirely clear.”132
to the agency the job of adjudicating violations and imposing the penalties; and (E) those
involving administrative imprisonments.
Id. at 111.
123. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1039 (1997); John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–25 (1986).
124. Id. at 9, 36.
125. Id. at 9.
126. Mark D. Alexander, Note, Increased Judicial Scrutiny for the Administrative Crime, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 612, 649 (1992).
127. Id. at 614 (footnote omitted).
128. A.J. Kritikos, Resuscitating the Non-Delegation Doctrine: A Compromise and an Experiment,
82 MO. L. REV. 441, 482 (2017).
129. Id. at 477.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 482.
132. Id.
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Before moving on, it is worth addressing two influential theories of delegation
and separation of powers in criminal law. While these theories do not directly
discuss administrative crimes, the theories have clear implications for the desirability
of these type of offenses.
Consider first Dan Kahan’s theory that the Department of Justice should
receive Chevron deference when interpreting federal criminal law—a theory
premised on a robust argument that delegation to the executive in criminal law has
“immense” benefits.133 Kahan begins by claiming that a criminal code defined
purely by the legislature is an “imaginary regime” given the “deliberate
incompleteness” of federal criminal statutes and that therefore most
crime-definition takes place in the judiciary.134 There is, then, a regime of delegation
already in place, but the current delegate (the judiciary) is inferior to the other choice
(the executive).135 The executive branch, unlike the judges, is “more likely to be
consistent,” “has more experience with criminal law enforcement,” and “is
ultimately accountable to the people.”136 Changing the delegate to the executive
would also “enhance notice” and “constrain arbitrary and partisan behavior by
individual prosecutors,” thus advancing “rule of law” values.137
While Kahan’s theory is presented primarily as a choice between two
delegates,138 he also presents an affirmative account of the value of delegation more
generally, describing the “advantages of delegation” as “immense” and
“systemic.”139 He writes, “Delegation—whether express or implied, whether to
agencies or courts—is a strategy for maximizing Congress’s policymaking influence
in the face of constraints on its power to make law.”140 The most significant
constraint for Kahan is “political”: “The difficulty of generating consensus on
politically charged issues can easily stifle legislation, particularly criminal
legislation.”141 Thus, delegation promotes “efficiency” in criminal lawmaking;
“[d]elegated criminal law costs less than legislatively specified criminal law and is
more effective to boot.”142 A system of purely-legislatively “specified” crimes
imposes “high practical and political costs” in that Congress is forced to “specif[y]
133. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996).
134. Id. at 470.
135. Id. (We must “change the identity of the delegate.”).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 471.
138. Id. at 470 (He aims to “the benefits of delegated criminal law-making” while “avoiding
the costs.”).
139. Id. at 488.
140. Id. at 474.
141. Id. He also notes time limitations. Id. at 475 (“Criminal law-making, in this respect,
confronts members of Congress with high opportunity costs: time spent enacting criminal legislation
necessarily comes at the expense of time that could be spent enacting legislation sought by small, highly
organized interest groups, which are more likely than the public at large to reward legislators for benefits
conferred and to punish them for disabilities imposed. Again, one solution is highly general (even purely
symbolic) criminal legislation, which takes little time to enact and which is likely to be sufficient to
satisfy the public’s demand for criminal law.”) (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 481.
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each of [the] prohibitions itself,” and due to higher costs there will be “reduced
output” of criminal legislation.143 Delegation is also more efficient in that it
facilitates the updating of criminal codes with new technology and behavior,144 and
in closing loopholes that emerge from experience in the code’s application.145
Kahan takes seriously the problem of gridlock on criminal issues, emphasizing,
“[t]hese are real social costs.”146 Reduced “output” in criminal law seems like a
strange concern in today’s era of overcriminalization and mass incarceration, but
given his underlying theory of legislation, Kahan’s point is a valid one. “I am
assuming here that efficiency in criminal law-making is good,” he writes, and
grounds this claim in a deeper “pragmatic conception” of separation of powers that
mostly “leave[s] institutions free to converge on allocations of authority that
maximize the power of government to pursue collective ends.”147 If criminal law
can help to advance social welfare, then institutional structures that prevent it from
being enacted are deleterious.
Kahan addresses the most obvious critique of his scheme head on—tension
with democracy. He argues that “[t]he law is likely to be closer in quantity and quality
to what the public demands when [delegates], at the behest of Congress, accept
responsibility for updating the law, closing loopholes, and infusing the law with the
practical insights of experience.”148 Democracy must mean, at least, advancing
popular will, and legislatures are too constrained to “satisfy the electorate’s demand
for criminal law.”149 Moreover, federal prosecutors are not totally isolated from
democratic inputs and controls: “[F]ederal prosecutors are appointed by the
President and are accountable to the Attorney General, [and] their participation in
constructing a system of federal common law crimes assures that its content will be
responsive to public sensibilities.”150
Kahan’s theory of beneficial delegation undoubtedly supports the creation of
administrative crimes. While his observations are technically limited to the dynamics
143. Id. at 481–82.
144. Id. at 482 (“Delegated common law-making also promotes the efficient updating of the
criminal code. As markets and technologies change, so do the forms of criminality that feed on them.
Keeping up with the advent of new crimes would severely tax Congress’s lawmaking resources, and no
doubt often exceed them, were Congress itself obliged to specify all operative rules of criminal law.”).
145. Id. (“A related efficiency associated with delegated common law-making is its power to
avoid loopholes. Criminality assumes diverse and heterogeneous forms. Enumerating all of them is
impossible. Accordingly, were Congress obliged to enact only fully specified criminal statutes, it would
often be possible for offenders to evade punishment by substituting unprohibited types of wrongdoing
for closely analogous illegal ones.”).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 482 n.81. He acknowledges the controversial nature of the claim: “This is in fact a
controversial assumption. According to one view, the chief virtue of separation of powers is that it
prevents the federal government from being perfectly responsive to the public demand for law; the
brake that it applies to the lawmaking process secures individual liberty.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
148. Id. at 484–85.
149. Id. at 484; see also Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999).
150. Kahan, supra note 133, at 485. He notes that this is true “at least in theory,” and he then
goes on to discuss pathologies. Id.
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between the DOJ, the federal judiciary, and Congress, they imply a deeper support
for legislative delegation to executive branch entities in all similar political systems.
The “political” constraint of consensus-generation preventing legislative outputs in
criminal law is not unique to the U.S. Congress and applies with comparable force
to state legislatures.
Kahan’s claims can be contrasted with those of Rachel Barkow.151 Barkow
argues that the functionalist pro-delegation consensus in administrative law
(typified by Kahan’s theory) produces dangerous results when applied to criminal
law.”152 She warns that in criminal law, the “structural and process” protections that
constrain most administrative law do not apply.153 The Administrative Procedures
Act (APA) does not limit prosecutorial discretion or the rulemaking of the United
States Sentencing Commission,154 and political process checks are “not as balanced
as they are in the regulatory sphere” because “those accused of crimes are among
the most politically anemic groups in the legislative process.”155 The only alternative
constraints—the individual rights provisions in the Constitution—are “poor
safeguards against structural abuses and inequities.”156
While the procedural protections in criminal law are weaker than in
administrative law generally, the sanctions attached to criminal violations are
nevertheless much higher. “The state poses no greater threat to individual liberty
than when it proceeds in a criminal action,” Barkow writes, as criminal proceedings
are “the means by which the state assumes the power to remove liberty and even
life.”157 She repeatedly highlights liberty deprivation as a unique sanction and also
mentions criminal sanctions’ condemnatory or stigmatic effects.158 Overall, the
primary need for a closer attention to separation of powers concerns in the criminal
context is because the “stakes are higher.”159 Weak protections against the harshest
state action results in a paradox: “Thus, in the very area in which state power is most
threatening—where it can lock away someone for years and impose the stigma of
criminal punishment—institutional protections are currently at their weakest.”160

151. Barkow, supra note 115.
152. Id. at 995.
153. Id. at 994.
154. Id. at 995.
155. Id. (“Criminal defendants do not coalesce into an organized group, and those individuals
and organizations that represent their interests tend to be disorganized and weak political forces. In
contrast, powerful interests often lobby for more punitive laws. The executive branch in particular has
an incentive to push for tough laws to encourage plea bargaining and cooperation. The politics of crime
definition and sentencing are therefore far more lopsided than the politics associated with the
administrative state, where it is more common to have groups on both sides of the issue that act to
check government abuse of power.”).
156. Id. at 993.
157. Id. at 995.
158. Id. at 1054 (“There is all the more reason to use it in the criminal context, where the stakes
are higher and the potential for abuse is so much greater.”).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 995.
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Barkow argues that “a more strict division of powers” in criminal law is the
appropriate response to this paradox,161 as “[t]he impediments to action provided
by the separation of powers check state abuse and preserve the interests of
individuals and local and political minorities.”162 Contra Kahan, efficiency of
criminal lawmaking is thus no trump card when assessing this arrangement: “The
inefficiency associated with the separation of powers serves a valuable function,
and, in the context of criminal law, no other mechanism provides a substitute.”163
Separation of powers works to achieve the constraints in criminal law that the APA
and political process provide in normal administrative law, and therefore advances
the underlying “liberty interests” that motivate the separation.164
Barkow’s argument for a stricter “division” of powers in the context of
criminal law has an obvious implication for administrative criminalization: if powers
must be strictly divided, then legislatures must not delegate criminalization authority
to executive branch agencies. Her observation that the Bill of Rights does little to
prevent structural abuse applies especially to the criminalization stage of the criminal
law process; these provisions create almost no limit on what can be criminalized
and how the offenses must be defined, and mostly cover how crimes can be
investigated, proven, and punished.165 Moreover, the political process checks are
similarly weak with many administrative crimes that affect “anemic” political groups
(the class of sex offenders in Gundy is a good example).166 However, like the Touby
Court, Barkow may be less troubled by administrative crimes given that the APA
and its state law analogues do apply to criminal rulemakings.
As we have seen, critiques of administrative crimes, both judicial and
academic, all employ a technique of observing the distinctively severe nature of
criminal sanctions versus other types of authoritative responses to violations of legal

161. Id. at 993–94 (“Although the administrative state has structural and process protections
that can justify some flexibility in the separation of powers, those checks are absent in the criminal
context. And in their absence, it is critically important to maintain a strict division of powers.”). Beyond
the “functionalist” argument presented above, Barkow also discusses another reason for strict
separation of powers in criminal law: history and constitutional text. She argues that the Framers were
concerned with aggregation of punitive state power in a single institution, and therefore codified
numerous criminal law protections in the Constitution itself. Id. at 994.
162. Id. at 1031 (She expects that this will be accomplished through a mechanism along the lines
of a “classic representation-reinforcing theory for judicial review.”).
163. Id. (“[A]rguments for dismantling this scheme on the basis of efficiency grounds—that the
state is hamstrung in its ability to proceed in criminal cases—disrupt the very core of why we have
separation of powers in the first place.”).
164. Id. at 996.
165. See Brenner M. Fissell, Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Law, 46 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 489 (2017) (summarizing the sparse substantive limits on criminalization that have
constitutional status). The two most significant limits on criminalization imposed by the Bill of Rights
are the requirement of specificity imposed by the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the limitations on
the punishment of speech that are imposed by the First Amendment.
166. Of course, this will not be true when the typical defendant affected by an administrative
crime is a large corporation or wealthy executive, as is the case with many financial and
environmental offenses.

First to Printer_Fissell (Do Not Delete)

880

3/17/2020 7:28 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:855

duties. Unique is the sanction’s ability to deprive individuals of liberty (and very
rarely, of life), but also unique is its condemnatory or stigmatizing effect.
Justice Brennan spoke of “liberty and the exercise of fundamental freedoms”
being implicated,167 while Justice Marshall wrote that the “severe impact of criminal
laws on individual liberty” made judicial review of administrative crimes
imperative.168 The Gundy dissenters, too, noted that in that case the “nation’s chief
prosecutor” was empowered to “adopt new federal laws restricting liberty.”169
Professors Abrahams and Snowden similarly noted this stigmatic effect in saying,
“[O]nly in connection with [a criminal] proceeding will [an offender’s] status as a
wrongdoer invoke certain attitudinal values of the community.”170 Similarly, Mark
Alexander writes, “[t]he criminal penalty represents the ultimate governmental
intrusion on individual freedom, together with a sense of community approbation
not present in other government action.”171 Professor Barkow also emphasizes the
“higher” “stakes” in criminal law, specifically in that criminal proceedings “are the
means by which the state assumes the power to remove liberty and even life,”172
and where “state power . . . can . . . impose the stigma of criminal punishment.”173
Finally, AJ Kritikos claims that criminal law delegations should be more suspect
because “life and personal liberty are at stake.”174
For all of these critics and commentators, the uniquely harsh sanctions that
result from criminal law violations makes delegation of criminalization a matter of
special concern apart from the standard subjects of administrative law. This is clearly
right. As Douglas Husak stated in another context, “[t]he criminal law is
different . . . because it burdens interests not implicated when other modes of social
control are employed.”175 This can be seen as the appropriate answer to the question
posed in Touby: whether “more specific guidance is in fact required . . . in the
criminal [delegation] context.”176
IV. A NEW ASSESSMENT
While the commentators above have accurately identified the immediate
intuitive objection to treating criminal law delegations in the same way that other
agency regulations are treated, more work must be done to theorize why this

167. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 277 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). Note that he is
concerned with the liberty to engage in protected conduct especially.
168. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170 (1991) (Marshall, J., concurring).
169. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
170. Abrahams & Snowden, supra note 122, at 9.
171. Alexander, supra note 126, at 614.
172. Barkow, supra note 115, at 995.
173. Id.
174. Kritikos, supra note 128.
175. Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 234
(2004). See generally Nils Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 521 (2005).
176. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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intuition is valid. We must go deeper than merely claiming that criminal law has
“higher stakes” because it deprives people of liberty and stigmatizes them; the
nature of these sanctions must be connected to a political theory that would provide
a principled reason for determining what types of lawmaking institutions are
permitted to employ these types of sanctions against violators. This is the goal of
the next section.
In what follows, I will first discuss the comparative peculiarity of the Supreme
Court’s (and some state high courts’) position on administrative crimes. While a
100-year, unbroken pedigree of validation following Grimaud makes critics of these
offenses seem like eccentric cranks, when one looks at most Western legal systems
(and indeed most U.S. states) it is the Supreme Court that appears to be the outlier.
This descriptive observation of peculiarity will help to motivate what will follow: a
normative justification of the majority position against administrative crimes.
This justification will begin with the so-called expressive theory of punishment,
which takes as its starting point the condemnatory dimension of state punishment.
I will argue that expressivism implies a commitment to democratic (and not
administrative) criminalization institutions, as administrative agencies cannot
express condemnation on behalf of a community. Next, the liberal theory of
punishment will be addressed. For this theory, the most significant aspect of state
punishment is its use of physical violence or coercion though liberty deprivation
(incarceration) or the deprivation of life (capital punishment). Because individuals
are thought to be free and autonomous in liberal theory, this violence can only be
justified by positing some form of consent to the criminalization system. I will argue
that, according to liberal theory, this hypothetical consent extends only to
criminalization by a democratic institution.
Many may wonder why, when discussing “punishment theory,” the ubiquitous
terms “consequentialism” and “retributivism” have not been mentioned.
Consequentialism is the argument that punishment is justified when it has beneficial
future effects; retributivism claims that punishment is justified when an offender
deserves it.177 Despite the dominance of these two theories in discussions of
punishment, I omit consideration of their effects on the validity of administrative

177. This is of course an oversimplification. As Leo Zaibert observed in 2002, “The more
or less straightforward, orthodox way of distinguishing between consequentialism and
retributivism, according to which consequentialists justify punishment attending to its
consequences, and retributivists justify punishment attending exclusively to desert, has now become
obsolete, as the debate has gained in sophistication and subtlety. The specialized literature is (over-)
crowded with sub-types of justifications of punishment: negative retributivism (desert is merely a
necessary condition for punishment), positive retributivism (desert is a sufficient condition for
punishment), side-constrained consequentialism (consequentialism circumscribed by desert), in
addition to a wide variety of “mixed theories” of punishment (theories that seek to combine
retributivism and consequentialism in multifarious ways).” Leo Zaibert, Punishment, Liberalism, and
Communitarianism, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 673, 675 (2002) (reviewing R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY (2001)).

First to Printer_Fissell (Do Not Delete)

882

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/17/2020 7:28 AM

[Vol. 10:855

crimes because the theories—at least as traditionally explicated178—have no
necessary political implications. First, these theories have usually been thought of
as moral theories, not political theories, and thus assess the concept of punishment
in both state and non-state contexts (say, in a family). “‘Punishment theory’—with
its tired push-me-pull-you of consequentialism and retributivism—largely has been
an exercise in applied moral theory,” writes Markus Dubber.179 “If the state appears
in discussions of punishment theory at all,” he concludes, “it’s often as an
afterthought, a political epilogue to a moral treatise.”180 While certain elements of
retributivism and consequentialism might be accommodated with or resonate with
certain political theories, the connection is not comprehensive or necessary.181
Retributivism and consequentialism may be implied or required by certain political
theories, but they themselves do not substantially limit the range of acceptable
political institutions.182 If what matters for retributivism is that blameworthy acts
are criminalized, then it doesn’t matter who or what decides what is
blameworthy—so long as they get it right. And if what matters for consequentialism
is that criminalization results in the increase of social utility, then the form of the
criminalization institution is irrelevant so long as it accurately assesses and enacts
utility-maximizing offenses.183
As I will argue below, this is not true of expressive theories of punishment, or
of consent-based liberal punishment theories. These theories necessarily imply a
certain theory of politics—namely, democracy.184 However, it is important to make
178. Guyora Binder has persuasively demonstrated that the primary figures in
intellectual history associated with these theories, Kant and Bentham, did not view them to be
moral theories divorced from politics. See Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 321 (2002). However, the history of these ideas has since departed from this
political concern. Id.
179. Markus D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2597, 2597 (2007).
180. Id.
181. Thus, while Nicola Lacey concludes that retributivism can be “seen to proceed from”
liberal theory, and that consequentialism “occup[ies] a secure place in the liberal tradition,” she
nevertheless states that consequentialism “differs in material respects from that of the retributive
theories.” NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES
156, 159 (1988).
182. This is compellingly demonstrated by the fact that each punishment theory has been
employed by those holding diametrically opposing political theories. Retributivism has been argued to
flow from Marxist theories as well as from Catholic natural law, id. at 153, while consequentialism has
been adopted by some Rawlsian liberals, Emmanuel Melissaris, Toward a Political Theory of Criminal
Law: A Critical Rawlsian Account, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 122, 139 (2012), but also some republicans.
See Philip Pettit, Consequentialism and Respect for Persons, 100 ETHICS 116 (1989).
183. Again, Binder reminds us that these denuded moral-philosophic conceptions of the
dominant theories of punishment have strayed far from what was intended by their most famous
proponents in intellectual history. See generally Binder, supra note 178.
184. There are other theories of punishment that are also attuned to theories of politics, but I
reserve discussion of these for another day. One such theory is the “republican” theory. See, e.g., JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1990); Ekow Yankah, d, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 457 (2015) (“A republican view of criminal law brings our
most natural intuitions back into focus by insisting that the core of criminal responsibility lies in the
offender’s attack on the civic bonds that make living in a society as equals possible.”).
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clear that I do not claim that the expressive and the liberal theories must coexist
conceptually. Indeed, many may think that such a synthesis is impossible.185
Moreover, while I will argue that each theory implies a need for democratic
criminalization, we will see that the two rely on different conceptions of
democracy.186 I do not attempt to resolve this tension here, although I believe that
it can be resolved.187 Instead, I present these two theories as, at the very least,
independent and alternative reasons for rejecting administrative crimes. When we
combine those who subscribe to liberal theories of punishment with those who
subscribe to expressive theories, though, we cover a very large portion of those who
think about state punishment. With these caveats now established, we may begin.188

185. Expressive theory, as we will see, condemns offenders in the name of the community; this
appears to require some sort of desert-based schema with which the state can determine what is worthy
of condemnation. As Christopher Bennett argues, “[b]ecause the right to punish must, on the expressive
theory, include the right to issue deserved condemnation, the account of state authority implied by the
expressive theory must include some account of (epistemic) moral authority.” Christopher Bennett,
Expressive Punishment and Political Authority, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 285 (2011). This seems to
conflict with a fundamental premise of liberalism: that political institutions will not import principles
of decision derived from contestable visions of the meaning of human life (what Rawls called
“comprehensive doctrines”). JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 15 (Erin Kelly
ed., 2001) (He is thinking here, mostly, of religion). A liberal state, writes Emmanuel Melissaris, “cannot
invoke controversial moral doctrines, which inescapably generate irresolvable disputes,” but must
instead “be grounded in a manner that is neutral.” Melissaris, supra note 182, at 123. Expressivism’s
claim to epistemic moral authority, it seems, is at odds with liberalism’s requirement of neutrality.
Bennett, supra 291. (Bennett summarizes, “it is one thing to think that the state has the authority to
protect citizens from one another; it is another to say that the state has the authority to intervene in its
citizens lives in order to dictate to citizens about which standards they ought to find important and to
impose condemnation on them when they disobey. The latter conception of authority might look
overbearing, even preachy.”).
186. The expressivist account relies on a majoritarian or self-determination conception, while
liberal theory relies on the conception of democracy as advancing the values of liberty and equality.
This will be discussed in more depth in what follows.
187. Others have undertaken this task. See generally Bennett, supra note 185.
188. A few additional, but less important, caveats should be mentioned. First, I limit my
arguments to the punishment of natural, not corporate, persons. While a great many administrative
crimes will punish corporations as well as individuals, see generally 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2012) (creating
general criminal penalty for violation of regulations of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), the
status of corporations in liberal democracy and their claim to resist state punishment is different from,
and almost certainly inferior to, the place of natural persons—citizens who can vote and be physically
imprisoned. For assessments of the place of corporations in the political theory of punishment, see
recent work by W. Robert Thomas, Towards a Political Philosophy of Corporate Crime (draft on file with
author). Thomas’s other work helps to demonstrate that general observations about punishment
theories cannot be easily transposed onto the case of corporate defendants. See W. Robert Thomas,
Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905 (2019). Moreover, it should be mentioned
that corporations themselves fail to satisfy the demands of any minimal conception of democratic
governance. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74
UMKC L. REV. 41 (2005). Second, in arguing that administrative crimes are illegitimate because they
are not created by a democratic legislature, I am not claiming that existing legislative alternatives (such
as the U.S. Congress) are good examples of functioning democratic institutions. To the extent that my
argument depends on any comparison with these alternatives, with all their practical shortcomings, I
will at least insist that they are comparatively more democratically legitimate than are agencies. For a larger
discussion about the debate regarding the comparative “democratic” features of agencies and Congress,
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A. Comparative Peculiarity
When one focuses solely on U.S. Supreme Court cases, the 100-year pedigree
of administrative crimes makes criticisms by a small number of academics and
judges seem like the protestations of an outlier group. If one expands one’s view,
though, it is the U.S. Supreme Court that is in relative isolation on this issue.
Consider three observations that highlight this: the general trend away from
common law crimes, the majority position in state constitutional law prohibiting
criminal law delegations, and finally the prevailing view of most Western
legal systems.
“Common law crimes” are criminal offenses created by the judiciary, and they
are prohibited federally as well as in most states. The Supreme Court banned this
practice in the federal courts as early as 1812,189 and the strong trend in state law
has been to either abolish such crimes entirely or confine them to very narrow
subject matters. A very recent study by Carissa Hessick indicates that by 1947,
eighteen states had abolished common law crimes expressly, and by 1976, this had
risen to twenty-seven states.190 Today, Hessick reports that only fifteen jurisdictions
“[expressly] recognize the common law authority of judges to convict for conduct
that is not criminalized by statute.”191 Moreover, in this minority of common law
crime jurisdictions, the offenses that are judicially created in general belong to the
category of petty misdemeanors. The drafters of the Model Penal Code noted in
their commentaries that “[t]he preservation of the common law has its largest
practical importance in the residual area of common law misdemeanors, public
mischief and indecency offenses.”192 Thus, while common law crimes retain some
nominal validity in a number of states, they no longer have vitality as serious
components of the criminal law. The trend away from common law crimes is not
directly relevant to the question of administrative crimes, but the principle that
motivates this trend is the same that should motive critiques of these offenses: it is
the legislature that must create criminal offenses, not judge or executive
branch officials.193

see infra pp. 51–52. Finally, it is worth clarifying (or emphasizing) that I do not view democratic
legitimacy as a sufficient condition for criminalization—it is merely a necessary condition.
189. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
190. Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV 965, 980 (2019).
191. Id. at 982.
192. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05 cmt. at 78–79 (1985); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(e), at 148 n.54 (3d ed. 2018) (“[See Wharton’s], where three
categories of common law crimes are listed: (1) those which tend to provoke a public disturbance,
(2) those involving injury to another’s property in such a way as to invite violent retaliation, (3) those
constituting public scandal or public indecency.”) (citing 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 18–24
(12th ed. 1932)); Hessick, supra note 190, at 982 (noting offenses of indecent exposure and “indecent
handling of a dead body,” but also more serious offenses of robbery in North Carolina and
manslaughter in Mississippi). The robbery and manslaughter examples appear to be outliers.
193. For a criticism of the developments in criminal law due to the trend away from common
law crimes, see generally Hessick, supra note 190, at 971 (arguing that codification has resulted in vague
and overly broad statutes, with crime definition delegated to prosecutors). Note, however, that Hessick
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Next, consider the prevalent view on the nondelegation doctrine in state
constitutional law—already discussed above. As Rossi documents, thirty-five state
constitutions contain a “strict separation of powers clause” that not only divides
power between branches but that also “instructs that one branch is not to exercise
the powers of any of the others.”194 And the judges in those and other states have
vigorously enforced this division: “Most state courts, unlike their federal
counterparts, adhere to a strong nondelegation doctrine.”195 In the majority of
states, administrative crimes would be unlawful as a matter of state
constitutional law.
Finally, when one expands one’s view beyond American law, the peculiarity of
Grimaud and its progeny becomes even more apparent. The United States is likely
in the minority of Western nations that permits state punishment based on
administratively defined crimes. This is probably true because the primary
competitor to the Anglo-American legal heritage is the “civil law” or “civilian”
systems of Continental Europe, South America, and the Caribbean.196 In the civil
law system, crimes usually must be specified by a legislature. One comparativist
traces this requirement to the civilian legal principle of lex scripta: “Continental
European legal systems interpret the lex scripta principle as requiring penalties to
be based upon codified laws (written laws provided by the legislature).”197 George
Fletcher concurs, writing that “it would be difficult to imagine a modern
constitution without some recognition of the principle of legislative supremacy,”198
and citing to German Basic Law Art. 103(2): “An act may be punished only if it was
defined by a law as a criminal offence.”199 Fletcher also points to similar provisions
in the Belgian and Chilean Constitutions.200

does not further argue that we should turn back the clock to a common law criminal regime: “Our
country is unlikely to return to a system of criminal common law, and this Article does not argue that
it should. But it is important that we do not oversimplify the story about the shift from common law
crimes to common law.” Id.
194. Rossi, supra note 82, at 1190.
195. Jim Rossi, Commentary, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. [xxi] (1999).
196. See generally LUIS E. CHIESA, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND
COMPARATIVE MATERIALS (2014) (discussing comparative systems).
197. Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A Theory on the Principle of Legality
in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 857, 865 (2009).
198. 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 84 (2007).
199. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 103(2) (Ger.), translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf [ https://perma.cc/76HX-2HNU ] ( last visited Dec. 28,
2019 ). Note these other relevant provisions: GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 104(1) (“Liberty
of the person may be restricted only pursuant to a formal law and only in compliance with the
procedures prescribed therein.”); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 74(1) (“Concurrent legislative
power shall extend to the following matters: . . . criminal law”).
200. See FLETCHER, supra note 198, at 84 n.48 (first citing LA CONSTITUTION art 12, cl. 2 (Belg.)
(“No person may be prosecuted except in cases established by the law and in the form it prescribes.”);
and then citing CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.] art. 19, § 7(b) (“No one
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This background constitutional requirement of legislative criminalization in
the civil law world makes administrative crimes a foreign concept in many of these
countries’ criminal laws. Consider this observation from two Spanish scholars:
[R]egardless of the exquisitely specific way in which an administrative
regulation may define conducts that give rise to criminal liability, the
principle of legality requires that such specificity in the definition of
criminal conduct stem from legislative action rather than from
administrative regulation, for the legitimacy of criminal law flows from
criminalization decisions that reflect the popular will of the people as
expressed by their elected representatives.201
Similarly, in a comparative study of nondelegation doctrine in the U.S. and in
Germany, Uwe Kischel criticizes the Grimaud rule and contrasts it with German
law: “Unlike Germany . . . the United States does not consider the definition of the
primary rules of conduct, which are safeguarded by criminal sanctions, to be such a
delicate and important matter.”202 Given all this, Luis Chiesa concludes that the
phenomenon of administrative crimes long approved by the U.S. Supreme Court
would “surely fail to satisfy” the requirements of civil law constitutions.203
An example of this principle in action was the backlash by certain member
states against administrative crimes introduced by the European Union. Consider a
decision by the German Constitutional Court in 2016 reviewing the validity of a
German law that criminalized the mislabeling of meat in violation of “regulation.”204
The German ministry in charge of the food industry created regulations but did so
merely by copying EU regulations on point.205 The court held that this violated the

may be deprived of his personal freedom nor may such freedom be restricted except for the cases and
in the manner determined by the constitution and the laws.”)).
201. CHIESA, supra note 196, at 79.
202. Uwe Kischel, Delegation of Legislative Power to Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of United
States and German Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 241 (1994).
203. CHIESA, supra note 196, at 79. While this is Chiesa’s view, and is perhaps best exemplified
by the Spanish position on this issue, other comparativists problematize this claim. I am indebted to
Alessandro Corda for the following example of a somewhat compromised legality principle in a civil
law country: In Judgement No. 168 of July 5, 1971, the Italian Constitutional Court upheld the offense
of “Non-compliance with Orders of Authority” against a legality principle challenge. See D.L. 5 luglio
1971, n.168, G.U. Jul. 14, 1971, n. 177 (It.), https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1971/07/
14/071C0168/s1 (It.) [ https://perma.cc/64MT-9JLX ]. The offense text stated, “Whoever fails to
observe a lawful order issued by the authorities in the interest of justice or of public safety, of public
order or of health, shall be punished . . . .” The Court held that even though the administrative
authorities played a role in specifying the conduct that constituted the lawful order, this did not violate
the legality principle because the “categories” or “classes” of orders and regulations were clearly
identified. In my view, this looks much like an American criminal contempt provision, and seems less
like a delegation of rulemaking.
204. BVerfG, 2 BvL 1/15, Sept. 21, 2016, http://www.bverfg.de/e/ls20160921_
2bvl000115.html [https://perma.cc/Z7UL-KKMG ] ( last visited Dec. 28, 2019 ). Thanks to Antje du
Bois-Pedain for making me aware of this general reaction to EU administrative crimes and of this case.
205. Id.
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legal certainty principle in German constitutional law because the punished conduct
was not included in the formal offense.206
The trend away from common law crimes (demonstrating an attention to the
value of legislative criminalization), the majority position in state constitutional law,
and the view of most civil law nations all help to highlight the peculiarity of the
ratification of administrative crimes by the U.S. Supreme Court. While 100 years of
unbroken jurisprudence connect Grimaud to Gundy, these decisions seem more
isolated when viewed in contexts.
The comparative peculiarity of administrative crimes helps to motivate a
theoretical inquiry into their legitimacy. In what follows, I will offer normative
justifications for the general rejection of administrative crimes, focusing on the two
most important dimensions of criminal punishment: community condemnation and
liberty deprivation. Each aspect of state punishment will be analyzed in terms of a
theory of punishment that has implications for what political institutions can
legitimately criminalize conduct.
B. Expressive Theories of Punishment
We begin with punishment’s condemnatory dimension, and the theory that
understands this to be its most essential aspect: “expressivist” punishment theory.
Most criminal lawyers are familiar with the dominant theories discussed above, but
fewer know “expressivism” (although this theory has at times been widely held in
academia).207 A recent formulation of the core expressivist insight is as
follows: “punishment is permissible at least in part because it is the only, or the best,
way for society to express condemnation of the criminal offense.”208 Expressivism
in punishment theory originates from the legal philosopher Joel Feinberg, who
argued that “punishment is a conventional device for the expression
of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and
reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in
whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”209 Thus, punishment possesses a
“symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.”210
206. Id. (“[The law] merely refers to a reference point which has not been further specified by
reference to the aforementioned European legal acts, and to a more restrictive set of behavioral
requirements and prohibitions. Instead of determining by itself or by reference to another law, which
behavior should be punishable by punishment, [the law] leaves it to the Federal Ministry, as far as it is
necessary for the enforcement of the legal acts of the European Community, . . . to designate the
offenses which are to be punished as a criminal offense . . . . Since the decree-maker therefore decides
which conduct should be punishable, the possible cases of criminal liability can not be foreseen on the
basis of the law, but only on the basis of [the EU] beef labeling criminal regulation. Thus, it constitutes
an unlawful blanket [ ] authorization for the transposition of [EU Law] by a national regulation.”).
207. Joshua Glasgow, The Expressivist Theory of Punishment Defended, 34 LAW & PHIL. 601,
601 (2015) (“[E]xpressivist theories of punishment received largely favorable treatment in the 1980s
and 1990s.”).
208. Id. at 602.
209. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965).
210. Id.
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Condemnation is a mix of affective and rational disapproval, communicated
publicly for the sake of emphasizing the values informing that disapproval, on
behalf of an authoritative source. Feinberg’s insight was that punishment was more
than just “hard treatment,” but also “ritualistic condemnation” with “symbolic
conventions.”211 In other words, criminal punishment inflicts some form of
suffering upon the offender, but it does so while conveying a certain kind of
meaning.212 That punishment possesses this additional feature of punishment
beyond physicality—this communication of condemnation—is the central claim of
the expressivist theory of punishment.213
Feinberg, the first modern expressivist, saw condemnation as serving multiple
functions. It communicated an “authoritative disavowal” of the offender’s act, and
“symbolic nonacquiescence” in that act.214 Thus, in condemning the offender, the
state “go[es] on the record” as against his conduct, and therefore “the law testif[ies]
to the recognition” that the conduct is wrongful.215 Moreover, such expressed
condemnation “vindicate[s]” or “emphatically reaffirm[s]” the law’s efficacy, and
absolves others suspected of wrongdoing.216
Jeanne Hampton, one of Feinberg’s colleagues and interlocutors, added
substantial clarifications to his theory. Hampton emphasized that the point of the
symbolic communication of condemnation was to “reaffirm[ ]” the “moral equality”
of the victim and offender.217 Punishment, she argued,

211. Id.
212. Consider the following explanation by Bernard Harcourt: “Suppose that someone gives
another person a Heimlich maneuver. If the recipient is choking on her dinner, it is likely that the
Heimlich maneuver will be interpreted as an act of good samaritanism and will be rewarded. The
expressive dimension of that act is compassion, assistance, and support. If the recipient is a total
stranger walking in the street, it is likely that the Heimlich maneuver will be interpreted as an assault
and battery, a crime.” Bernard Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on Crime and Punishment: Exploring the
Relationship Between the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law and the Expressive Function of Punishment, 5
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 160 (2001).
213. Scholars attempting to theorize a distinction between criminal and civil wrongs have also
highlighted this feature of criminal law. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the
Criminal and Civil Law Models-and What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878 (1992)
(“Most commentators acknowledge that the following attributes tend to distinguish the criminal law
from the civil law: . . . (5) its deliberate intent to inflict punishment in a manner that maximizes stigma
and censure.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
402–04 (1958) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is
ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition.”); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1809 (1992) (“In modern criminal law, the stigma of a criminal sanction has
become a special kind of remedy because of its burdensome and sometimes destructive consequences
for the individual.”).
214. Feinberg, supra note 209, at 404–05.
215. Id. at 406.
216. Id. at 407.
217. Heather J. Gert et al., Hampton on the Expressive Power of Punishment, 35 J. SOC. PHIL. 79,
80 (2004); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992).
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is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of the victim
denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the construction of an event that
not only repudiates the action’s message of superiority over the victim but
does so in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity.218
Given this goal, punishment is best performed by the state, in the name of the
community:
the modern state is the citizenry’s moral representative – in the face of
pluralism and religious controversy, it is the only institutional voice of
the community’s shared moral values . . . and thus . . . the only
institution that can speak and act on behalf of the community against
the diminishment offered by . . . crime.219
Another important expressivist theorist is Antony Duff, whose central
contribution is to emphasize punishment’s communicative aspect to the offender.220
“Although some theorists talk of the ‘expressive’ purpose of punishment,” Duff
notes, “we should rather talk of its communicative purpose: for communication
involves, as expression need not, a reciprocal and rational engagement.”221 For
Duff, then, the primary value in the expression is that it is heard by someone.
Punishment “communicat[es] to offenders the censure that their crimes
deserve.”222 This communication “engage[s] that person as an active participant,”
and also “appeals to the [person’s] reason and understanding.”223 “Communication
thus addresses the other as a rational agent,” he argues, “whereas expression need
not.”224 The goals of the communication are “repentance, reform,
and reconciliation.”225
Duff goes further than saying that criminal punishment produces the above
valuable consequences but instead argues that it is “something that a liberal state
has a duty to do.”226 First, “the state owes it to its citizens to protect them from
crime,” and second, “the state owes something too to its citizens as potential
criminals.”227 “That means treating and addressing them as citizens who are bound
by the normative demands of the community’s public values, who must thus be
218. Hampton, supra note 217.
219. HAMPTON, INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS 142 (2007); see also Alon Harel, Why Only the
State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113 (2008).
220. Duff’s seminal work is ANTONY DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND
COMMUNITY (2001).
221. Id. at 79.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 80.
225. Id. at 107. On repentance: “Repentance is . . . an aim internal to censure. When we censure
others for their wrongdoing, our intention or hope is that they will accept that censure as justified.”
Id. On reform: “To recognize and repent the wrong I have done is also to recognize the need to avoid
doing such wrong in the future.” Id. at 108. On reconciliation: “Reconciliation is what the repentant
wrongdoer seeks with those she has wronged—and what they must seek with her if they are still to see
her as a fellow citizen.” Id. Duff summarizes these as “secular penance.” Id. at 30.
226. Id. at 112.
227. Id. at 112–13.
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called to account and censured for their breaches of those values,” he writes.228
Communication of censure to offenders is an obligation of the state, but it is also
uniquely the role of the state (and not any other institution). Punishment will
“properly be manifested in what the state, as the legal embodiment of the political
community, does to or about the offender.”229
Expressivism has seen a recent resurgence in Joshua Kleinfeld’s theory of
“reconstructivism,” which he describes as “build[ing] on the expressivist insight
but . . . not identical to expressivism.”230 The “expressive” aspect of
reconstructivism is described as follows:
[P]unishment is a way of reconstructing a violated social order in the wake
of an attack. If, for example, Person A steals Person B’s property, the
nature of the wrong is not just the tangible harm to Person B, but also the
message that property rights in this jurisdiction are insecure, together with
the message that people like Person B can be abused. Punishment declares
that the right to property still holds and re-establishes the social status of
Person B.231
Kleinfeld helpfully adds that the offender himself is “expressing” something
when he violates a criminal law and that it is this that requires a response. The
response to a “message” sent by a criminal offense is to “declare” that it was wrong
through criminal punishment. “Condemnatory punishment with the community’s
backing is how societies typically do and must respond if their normative orders are
to be maintained,” Kleinfeld argues.232 This “normative order” is the “shared moral
culture” –important not so much because it may or may not be right, but because it
is the product of “solidarity.”233 “Social solidarity” is really just “some degree of
pragmatic agreement, mutual intelligibility, and fellow feeling” about what conduct
ought to be punished by the state.234
Crucially, Kleinfeld argues that reconstructivism implies or demands
democratic political institutions.235 “Reconstructivism as a theory of criminal justice
and democracy as a theory of government are thus linked by what they mutually
treasure,” Kleinfeld argues, “by the fact that both valorize a decent community’s
ability to build a distinctive form of life infused with values that are the community’s
own.”236 Kleinfeld’s conception of democracy is grounded in “popular sovereignty
and self-government,” and “focus[es] on whether the views of the people who make

228. Id. at 113.
229. Id. at 114.
230. Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1525 (2016).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1490.
233. Id. at 1492.
234. Id. at 1493.
235. Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1455 (2017).
236. Id. at 1456.
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up the political community are reflected in their law.”237 Thus, criminal law must
reflect majoritarian popular will, and “only those acts that violate and attack the
values on which social life is based, and can therefore truly be characterized as
‘antisocial,’ should be legally designated crimes.”238 Criminal law should not merely
be another “tool for social control that can be enlisted against anything we wish to
curb,” but instead be “restrict[ed] . . . to widely recognized and highly
culpable wrongdoing.”239
Kleinfeld has made an important point about expressivism, and one that is
probably implied or assumed by prior theorists: for state punishment to express the
community’s condemnation, the determination of what conduct leads to this
condemnation must be determined by the community. In other words,
criminalization must be democratic. Recall Feinberg’s comment that punishment
expresses “judgments of disapproval and reprobation” that might come from
“either . . . the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the
punishment is inflicted.”240 But Feinberg was speaking about punishment more
generally and not just state punishment. In the context of state punishment (and
not, say, in a family), one imagines he would have limited the source of the
condemnatory judgments to the political community as represented
democratically—the people “in whose name” the government acts. Hampton is
more direct: the state is the “only institutional voice of the community’s shared
moral values” and thus “the only institution that can speak and act on behalf of the
community.”241 While she did not invoke the term itself, only a democratic
criminalization institution can live up to this requirement.242 Similarly, Duff argues
that criminal law’s condemnatory feature is needed to censure those who violate
“the community’s public values,” and limits the punishing authority to the “state, as
the legal embodiment of the political community.”243 It is hard to imagine how
anything other than a democratic institution can approximate with legitimacy the
values of the entire community, and codify them into criminal law. Kleinfeld’s
linkage of expressivism and democracy thus makes explicit what was
long presupposed.
The insight of expressivist punishment theory is that the symbolic
communication of condemnation must come from the community and that
therefore the duties imposed by criminal law must be determined by a democratic
institution. This has significant implications for the legitimacy of administrative

237. Id. at 1465.
238. Id. at 1456. He calls this the “moral culture principle of criminalization.”
239. Id. at 1478.
240. Feinberg, supra note 209, at 397–423.
241. HAMPTON, supra note 219, at 142.
242. Given that she was speaking of a “modern” state in the context of “pluralism,” she almost
certainly meant a modern liberal democracy. Id.
243. Duff’s seminal work is DUFF, supra note 220, at 113–14.
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crimes. Overall, it means that because agencies cannot approximate or stand in for
the “community,” they are illegitimate criminalization institutions.
Agency decision-makers are not elected by a majority of the members of the
community, and therefore cannot claim to act or speak on behalf of the political
community or to be controlled by it. Citizens do not determine outcomes through
voting, and therefore agencies need not criminalize conduct in a manner that is
consistent with existing social norms. Even when their pronouncements align with
community values, though, this is problematic due to the skewed symbolic
significance of a condemnation that emanates from a bureaucratic (and not
democratic) source. We will explore these observations in what follows.
When expressivism244 claims that criminalization must be democratic, this
means “majoritarian”—“focus[ed] on whether the views of the people who make
up the political community are reflected in their law.”245 Majoritarianism has
implications for administrative crimes. Agencies, both federal and state, are almost
always (and at the federal level, always) controlled by appointees. These are people
who have some degree of interest or expertise with regard to an agency’s regulatory
mission, and who have political alignment (usually partisan) with an elected
executive who serves as the appointing authority. When regulations are issued that
carry criminal penalties, they are issued in the name of the administrative agency’s
head—not any elected person or institution. Consider the administrative crime
ratified by the Arizona Supreme Court that was discussed earlier relating to food
stamp fraud: in that case the offense was defined by the Director of the Arizona
Department of Economic Security, who is appointed by the Governor.246 The
administrative crime in Touby—possession of a controlled substance—was defined
by the Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator, an official appointed by the
President.247 Those with direct control over the makeup of agency regulations are
rarely elected (notable exceptions are many states’ attorneys general and treasurers).

244. Here, I mean the variant of expressivism typified by Kleinfeld’s work discussed earlier.
Kleinfeld, supra note 230.
245. Of course, there are competing theories of democracy. Kleinfeld, supra note 235, at 1465
(“[T]hose that see democracy exclusively in terms of governmental processes (e.g., voting in elections,
representative institutions, parliamentary supremacy, checks and balances); those that see democracy in
terms of advancing liberal values (e.g., equality, liberty, individual rights); and those that see democracy
in terms of collective self-determination, popular sovereignty, and self-government, and therefore focus
on whether the views of the people who make up the political community are reflected in their law (e.g.,
majoritarianism, communitarianism, certain types of republicanism).”); see also Kahan, supra note 149, at
796–97 (1999). Kahan identifies two competing variants of democracy—one being a “pluralist
conception [which] views government as more or less democratic depending on the extent to which
official decisions conform to the aggregated preferences of the electorate,” and the other, “civic
republicanism,” being concerned with “the extent that official decisions are reached through a process
of reflective deliberation on the ‘common good.’” Id. at 796. Kahan’s “pluralist” conception seems very
similar to Kleinfeld’s “collective self-determination” conception.
246. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1952 (2012).
247. Exec. Order No. 11,727, 38 Fed. Reg. 18,357 ( July 10, 1973). “There shall be at the head
of the Administration the Administrator of Drug Enforcement, hereinafter referred to as ‘the
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Because elected officials do not directly control the content of administrative
law, it is possible that administrative crimes can communicate a condemnatory
message that is not faithful to the larger viewpoint of the community. These would
be expressions of bureaucratic condemnation, not societal condemnation. Consider
various cases in which societal intuitions regarding punishment seem mismatched
with that being condemned by expert agencies.
A Colorado administrative crime relating to alcohol control is a good example.
Colorado’s Executive Director of the Department of Revenue has the power to
create rules regarding the “proper regulation and control of the . . . sale of
alcohol,”248 and violations of these rules are punishable as a “petty offense.”249
Some of the rules created, though, seem to be quite broad. This is especially true of
Regulation 47-900, which is called the “Conduct of Establishment” and governs the
premises of liquor licensees’ establishments.250 In the “Basis and Purpose” section
preceding the operative clauses, the Agency claims that “[t]he purpose of this
regulation is to exercise proper regulation and control over the sale of alcohol
beverages, promoting the social welfare, the health, peace and morals of the people
of the state, and to establish uniform standards of decency, orderliness, and service
within the industry.”251 Here an expert agency explicitly aims to promote the “peace
and morals” of the citizenry; that this is not merely stock language becomes
apparent when one reads the explicit rules. The Agency prohibits employees of
alcohol establishments from wearing revealing clothing (in which genitals or breasts
are revealed), but also prohibits patrons from engaging in certain conduct.252 One
strikingly broad provision prohibits “[a]ny person on [a] licensed premises touching,
caressing or fondling the breasts, buttocks, anus, or genitals of any other person.”253
This means that two lovers consensually touching each other’s buttocks in a bar are
committing criminal conduct. Similarly, patrons may not “[wear or use] any device
or covering of any kind, which exposes or simulates the breasts, genitals, anus, pubic
hair or any other portion thereof.”254 A wearable costume with the cartoon
depiction of breasts is therefore prohibited. Is this conduct worthy of societal
condemnation? Would such a criminal offense be able to garner a majority of votes
in the state legislature after an open debate and public scrutiny? Here we have an
example of moralistic criminalization via administrative agency.
Even when an agency is expressing condemnation that is in line with general
societal viewpoints, though, it is still a problem. In such a case, the condemnation
issued by the agency is an accurate reflection of what the community might itself
Administrator.’ The Administrator shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate . . . .” 5 U.S.C.A. app. § 5 (1973).
248. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-3-201-02 (2019).
249. Id. § 44-3-904.
250. 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 203-2:47-900 (2019).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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condemn if it got around to doing so, but it is not an expression of that
condemnation from the community; the two align out of coincidence or prudence on
the part of the agency, but not out of necessity. Crucially, this different,
non-majoritarian source deprives the condemnation of its “symbolic” significance.
Consider the following hypothetical: in a small midwestern town, a local codes
officer named Jim issues rules regarding trash pickup that are generally reasonable
and supported by most of the townsfolk. When Jim issues a fine for a citizen’s
failing to take in a trashcan before dark, does this sanction carry the same
sting—the same meaning—as it would if the elected town council had voted and
adopted the same rule? I think it does not. The fined citizen could legitimately say
“Jim does not speak for all of us” and could hold his head high at local dinner parties
without suffering the same stigma. The point is that condemnation may be rightly
visited upon certain conduct, but it carries a different meaning when the
decision-maker defining the conduct worthy of that condemnation does not speak
for the community—when the decision-maker is just “Jim” or any other person
who happens to hold a government office.
What truly symbolic condemnation demands is a majoritarian source of the
condemnation decision. Only a majority of the community can speak as the
community itself, and it must be the community that communicates or expresses to
the offender and to everyone else what conduct warrants condemnation. Of course,
we do not have a direct democracy in which popular vote determines the content
of the criminal law—nearly all criminal offenses are created by elected
representatives, and not by voter initiative. But “delegation” of condemnation
decisions to an elected representative is qualitatively different from that
representative’s further delegation to an unelected agency head. In the case of the
latter, and unlike the former, the citizen-voter is severed from the decisionmaker;
the citizen-voter cannot possibly register an authoritative voice for or against an
agency decisionmaker or an agency’s decision.255
If one accepts the above claim as a normative matter, this renders much of the
debate about the nondelegation doctrine less relevant in the context of criminal law.
First, consider what many have called the central issue with respect to
nondelegation: whether agencies are sufficiently “accountable” to the people.256
255. This is disputed by Posner and Vermeule, who write, “[b]eneath their masks, the critics of
delegation are direct democrats, and they should aim their arguments at representative democracy, not
at delegation, which is but a small part of it.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1754 (2002) (“In their preoccupation with delegation
among all the other devices used to make policy, the critics of delegation treat the nondelegation
doctrine as a fetish that would ward off all the evils of representative democracy.”). This critique seems
a bit overblown—at least if one is an expressivist. The expressivist, I think, would find that a qualitative
shift occurs when a citizen’s voice—his or her expression of condemnation—does not have authority
to weigh in and be counted with respect to the decisionmaker or the decision.
256. Thomas Merrill calls this “[t]he most prominent argument advanced by the proponents of
strict nondelegation,” which he describes as “the desirability of having public policy made by actors
who are accountable to the people.” Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2141 (2004). Cass Sunstein describes
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Critics of administrative delegations such as JH Ely emphasize the lack of electoral
control of administrators: “[t]he point is not that such ‘faceless bureaucrats’
necessarily do a bad job as our effective legislators. It is rather that they are neither
elected nor reelected, and are controlled only spasmodically by officials who are.”257
Defenders of delegation respond to this not by denying the desirability of
accountability but instead by emphasizing the potential for even greater
accountability through agency rulemaking. As Gerry Mashaw argues, “the flexibility
that is currently built into the processes of administrative governance by relatively
broad delegations of statutory authority permits a more appropriate degree of
administrative . . . responsiveness to the voter’s will than would a strict
nondelegation doctrine.”258
“Accountability,” though, seems outside of the concerns of the expressivist
punishment theory we have presented. What matters is not that condemnation be
communicated by an “accountable” official or institution, but that it be
communicated by the majority of the community itself, and through a majoritarian
decision-making process. It must be the emanation of the majority of the
community, and it is therefore problematic even when citizen preferences and
administrative punishment align harmoniously. Thus, Mashaw and Schuck’s (and
Kahan’s) promise of a more accessible and responsive administrative state will not
assuage the concerns of the expressivist. The same can be said to those who see
presidential or gubernatorial control, or congressional oversight, as solving the
accountability problem.259 These are post-hoc review mechanisms that need not be
the accountability argument as “the most important” functionalist claim of nondelegation proponents.
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 319 (2000).
257. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131 (1980); see also DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 14 (1993) (“We can refuse to reelect legislators who make laws we
dislike. Delegation shortcircuits this democratic option by allowing our elected lawmakers to hide
behind unelected agency officials.”); Merrill, supra note 256 (“Congress, it is argued, is the most
democratically accountable political institution; hence, if we want policy made by actors accountable to
the people, we should require that policy (at least ‘important’ policy) be made by Congress rather than
by unelected administrators.”).
258. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 153 (1997). Similarly, Peter
Schuck concludes that, “[t]oday, the administrative agency is often the site where public participation
in lawmaking is most accessible, most meaningful, and most effective.” Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and
Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781–82 (1999). Accessible
because “the costs of participating in the rulemaking and more informal agency processes, where many
of the most important policy choices are in fact made, are likely to be lower than the costs of lobbying
or otherwise seeking to influence Congress.” Meaningful because “the policy stakes for individuals and
interest groups are most immediate, transparent, and well-defined at the agency level.” Effective
because “the agency is where the public can best educate the government about the true nature of the
problem that Congress has tried to address” and because “the details of the regulatory impacts are
hammered out there.”
259. As Jerry Mashaw writes, “[a]ll we need do is not forget there are also presidential elections
and that, as the Supreme Court reminds us in Chevron, presidents are heads of administrations.”
MASHAW, supra note 258, at 152. Thus, for Mashaw, vague delegations to agencies are “a device for
facilitating responsiveness to voter preferences expressed in presidential elections.” Sunstein, supra note
256, at 323 (“Agencies are themselves democratically accountable via the President, and any delegation
must itself be an exercise of lawmaking authority, operating pursuant to the constitutional requirements
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undertaken as a matter of course; majoritarian control, as I have explained it, must
be present at the initial stage of criminalization. For the expressive dimension of
criminal law, “accountability” is not enough—it is not just that problematic outlier
offenses must be redressable, but that every offense must originate from a
majoritarian wellspring.
Beyond accountability, consider a second major debate regarding
nondelegation: the value of agency deliberative process. This debate can be situated
within the “civic republicanism” tradition, which is concerned with “the extent that
official decisions are reached through a process of reflective deliberation on the
‘common good.’”260 Almost everyone agrees that reasoned deliberation is a good
thing, and therefore critics and defenders of agency delegation have each sought to
assess whether agencies do this more effectively than a legislature. An elaborate
presentation of this argument has been undertaken by Mark Seidenfeld, who notes
that unlike Congress,
[a]dministrators at least operate within a set of legal rules
(administrative law) that keep them within their jurisdiction, require
them to operate with a modicum of explanation and participation of
the affected interests, police them for consistency, and protect them
from the importuning of congressmen . . . who would like to carry
logrolling into the administrative process.261
All this is probably true: when comparing the legislative process with the
administrative process, the latter seems far more rational and deliberative.
Again, though, this is all beside the point—stellar deliberative processes

for the making of federal law. Congress may face electoral pressure merely by virtue of delegating broad
authority to the executive; this is a perfectly legitimate issue to raise in an election, and ‘passing the
buck’ to bureaucrats is unlikely, in most circumstances, to be the most popular electoral strategy. If
Congress has delegated such authority, perhaps that is what voters want.”). With respect to Congress,
Peter Schuck lists the following as its “numerous formal and informal controls over agency
discretion”: “statutory controls; legislative history; oversight; the appropriations process; statutory
review of agency rules; and confirmation of key personnel.” Schuck, supra note 258, at 784. Posner and
Vermeule also remind us that Congress can be chastised by the people for its use of delegation. Posner
& Vermeule, supra note 255, at 1748–49 (“The problem with this argument is that Congress is
accountable when it delegates power—it is accountable for its decision to delegate power to the agency.
If the agency performs its function poorly, citizens will hold Congress responsible for the poor design
of the agency, or for giving it too much power or not enough, or for giving it too much money or not
enough, or for confirming bad appointments, or for creating the agency in the first place. And, as noted
above, Congress is accountable not only in this derivative sense. Congress retains the power to interfere
when agencies make bad decisions; indeed, it does frequently . . . . Accountability is not lost through
delegation, then; it is transformed.”).
260. Id. at 797.
261. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515, 1542 (1992). Thomas Merrill also notes that “[a]dministrative
rulemaking . . . is subject to a much more unyielding set of procedural requirements [than legislation],
including advance notice to the public, disclosure of studies and data on which the agency relies,
extensive opportunity for public comment, and a requirement that agencies respond to and explain
their disagreement with material comments submitted from any quarter.” Merrill, supra note 256,
at 2155.
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cannot save administrative crimes from the expressivist critique advanced above.
This critique cares primarily about “who” decides to criminalize and is unconcerned
with “how” except insofar as the process is directly related to the need for a
legitimate source of the criminalization decision. Thus, a process requirement of
majoritarian voting is necessary, but there is no requirement that very good debates
take place before the vote is taken. Tellingly, civic republican proponents of
delegation are candid in their disavowal of majoritarianism. “[T]he theory,”
Seidenfeld admits, “does not equate the public good that legitimates government
action with majority rule.”262
C. Liberal Theories of Punishment
Having completed a discussion of the condemnatory dimension of criminal
sanctions, and its relevance for administrative crimes, we turn to the aspect of state
punishment that involves liberty-deprivation. This aspect implicates a different
theory of punishment that is concerned with the legitimacy of state coercion
deployed against autonomous individuals. This is the “liberal” theory of
punishment, which might also be described as a “consent-based” theory. Roughly,
the liberal theory of punishment posits that the violent coercion inherent in criminal
sanctions is only legitimate if it can somehow be thought of as consented to. We
shall explore this somewhat counterintuitive proposition in what follows and will
see that it has significant implications for the legitimacy of administrative crimes.
It is said, rightfully, that the United States aspires to be a “liberal” state—not
in the sense of left-wing social and economic policy, but in the sense that it takes a
respect for individuals’ freedom and equality as its foundational political principle.
As Sharon Dolovich writes, a liberal state “elevates individual liberty in its many
forms to the highest political value . . . and measures the legitimacy of political
systems by the degree to which they accord sovereignty to the people,” and in the
United States, “political life . . . is routinely punctuated with the rhetorical
invocation of these very values.”263 Thus, the self-conception and indeed aspiration
of this country is to adhere to the principles of liberalism. But this is no passing fad,
nor is the United States alone in this regard. Noting that liberalism has achieved an
“ideological victory,” intellectual historian Duncan Bell concludes that “[m]ost
inhabitants of the West are now conscripts of liberalism: the scope of the tradition
has expanded to encompass the vast majority of political positions regarded as
legitimate.”264

262. Id. at 1528.
263. Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307,
312 n.11 (2004).
264. Duncan Bell, What Is Liberalism?, 42 POL. THEORY 682, 689 (2014); see also Raymond
Geuss, Liberalism and Its Discontents, 30 POL. THEORY 320, 320 (2002) (“[W]e know of no other
approach to human society that is at the same time as theoretically rich and comprehensive as liberalism
and also even as remotely acceptable to wide sections of the population in Western societies . . . .”).
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Given the central importance of liberalism in American politics and western
political thought, it is worth identifying the element of liberalism most relevant for
criminal law265: the concept of individual autonomy or freedom.266 Liberalism takes
this as its starting point, and structures political institutions around this
bedrock value.267
Given the centrality of the value of individual autonomy, liberalism tests the
legitimacy of political institutions and how they act against this value.268 As Lacey
writes, a feature of liberalism “closely related to the value attached to autonomy” is
that liberalism “generates a relatively stringent conception of the limits of state
action.”269 Governmental restrictions on liberty are “subject to a heavy burden of
justification” in a liberal state,270 and restrictions that fail to meet this burden, then,
are said to be “illegitimate.”271
What can serve as a justification for the restriction on autonomy, though, and
when can such a justification meet the “burden” of legitimacy? This question
becomes most critical when assessing the institution of state punishment. State
punishment is a species of coercion, and is thus among the most intrusive forms of
state action; even more significantly, though, this coercion takes the form of
violence. Punishment thus presents a problem for a liberal theorist—autonomy
must be respected, but punishment severely curtails it.272 This, at least, is
265. For a discussion of a more complete range of the features of liberalism, see LACEY, supra
note 181, at 143–68. For history of the idea, see generally Bell, supra note 264.
266. LACEY, supra note 181, at 93 (“Closely related to the liberal vision of rational persons is
the notion of humans as free and responsible agents, capable of understanding and controlling their
own actions . . . . Both rationality and the capacity for responsible action are thus for liberalism at once
factual features of human nature and sources of normative limits on the ways in which human beings
may be treated, particularly by political and other public institutions.”).
267. Thus, Dolovich labels “individual liberty” a “baseline” “liberal democratic value” while
Emmanuel Melissaris notes that respect for personal freedom is a “fundamental liberal assumption.”
Dolovich, supra note 263, at 313–14; Melissaris, supra note 182, at 123.
268. Markus Dubber calls autonomy the “fundamental touchstone of legitimacy” in “modern
democratic societies.” “Legitimacy discourse in the United States since the Revolution has revolved
around autonomy; its recurrent theme is the call for more thorough application of the ideal, not for its
replacement with another guiding principle.” Dubber, supra note 179, at 2603.
269. LACEY, supra note 181, at 97–98.
270. Id.
271. Indeed, some theorists claim that all political authority is illegitimate. See William
A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 215 (2004) (discussing
philosophical anarchist position).
272. “[Liberal] theorists were inclined to view punishment (a certain kind of coercion by the
state) as not merely a causal contributor to pain and suffering, but rather as presenting at least a prima
facie challenge to the values of autonomy and personal dignity and self-realization-the very values
which, in their view, the state existed to nurture. The problem as they saw it, therefore, was that of
reconciling punishment as state coercion with the value of individual autonomy.” Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217, 223 (1973); see also Dolovich, supra note 263, at 310
(“Any theory of state punishment in a liberal democracy must grapple with the problem of political
legitimacy. The punishment of criminal offenders can involve the infliction of extended deprivations
of liberty, ongoing hardship and humiliation, and even death. Ordinarily, such treatment would be
judged morally wrong and roundly condemned, yet in the name of criminal justice, it is routinely
imposed on members of society by state officials whose authority to act in these ways toward sentenced
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uncontroversial: for a liberal state, punishment poses a major legitimacy problem.273
For such a fundamental problem, though, punishment theorists have made
surprisingly few attempts to address it. Instead, punishment has largely been
examined as an issue in moral philosophy.274
This has begun to change; liberal philosophers of punishment and liberal
theorists of criminal law have increasingly sought to reconcile their political theories
with the phenomenon of state punishment.275 As Alice Ristroph argues, if “there is
some relationship between the legitimacy of punishment and more general political
legitimacy,” then “theorists of state punishment should engage” with the latter.276
Theorists who have heeded this call generally attempt the reconciliation by positing
that consent of the citizen bound by criminal law can solve punishment’s legitimacy

offenders is generally taken for granted.”); Dubber, supra note 179 (“[A]s the most severe form of state
coercion, punishment poses the most serious challenge to the legitimacy of the state. If punishment can
be justified, so can other, lesser, forms of coercive state action. If it cannot, what is the point of
legitimizing, say, taxation (with or without representation)? . . . . [O]ne way of framing the question of
legitimacy might be this: how can a state that derives its legitimacy from protecting its constituents’
rights violate the very rights it exists to protect?”).
273. Claire Finkelstein, Punishment As Contract, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L 319, 324 (2011) (“My
point of departure will be an assumption that has become standard in the punishment theory literature.
Because it involves the deprivation of personal liberty and the infliction of physical hardship,
punishment is presumptively impermissible. The practice of punishment therefore stands in need of
justification if the background moral objections to it are to be overridden.”).
274. “Although normative inquiry into justifications of punishment has been extensive, it has
largely been pursued from the perspective of moral philosophy.” Corey Brettschneider, The Rights of
the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy, 35 POL. THEORY 175, 175 (2007); see also Binder, supra
note 178. One potential explanation for this is that many of these philosophers believe that state
punishment cannot be legitimized; this is the position of the so-called “philosophical anarchists” who
deny the legitimacy of political and legal authority altogether (including, of course, criminal law) and
also of modern radical and critical legal theorists. See Edmundson, supra note 271, at 219. Others who
are neither philosophical anarchists nor critics may come to the same conclusion from an observation
of punishment practices in the real world. “In fact, an open-minded inquiry into the principles and
norms (never mind the actual operation) of American penal law must be prepared to conclude that the
difficulties of legitimating the state violation of the autonomy of its constituents through the threat and
eventual infliction of punitive pain (as opposed to some other, less intrusive, means) are
insurmountable.” Dubber, supra note 179, at 2612. “It also generally follows that punishment, as we
currently know and understand it, may not be an appropriate measure at all and should never be
employed.” Melissaris, supra note 182, at 142–43. However, I suspect that the lack of attention paid to
the political legitimacy of punishment has a more mundane explanation—it is because the topic of
punishment first became debated vigorously in the philosophy departments of universities, and not in
politics or law departments. See generally Michael Davis, Punishment Theory’s Golden Half Century: A
Survey of Developments from (About) 1957 to 2007, 13 J. ETHICS 73 (2009).
275. “In recent years, the counterintuitive claim that criminals consent to their own punishment
has been revived by philosophers who attempt to ground the justification of punishment in some
version of the social contract.” Richard Dagger, Social Contracts, Fair Play, and the Justification of
Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341, 341 (2011); see also VINCENT CHIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE
AGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, at vii (2018) (“The criminal law is a public institution that has
a profound impact on people’s lives. It therefore seems appropriate to see how it stacks up under
familiar principles of political justification . . . .”).
276. Alice Ristroph, Conditions of Legitimate Punishment, in THE NEW PHILOSOPHY OF
CRIMINAL LAW 79, 83 (Zachary Hoskins & Chad Flanders eds., Rowman & Littlefield 2015).
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deficit.277 This is not the consent of the individual criminal to be incarcerated, but
instead the constructive consent of a rational or reasonable hypothetical citizen
setting up a political institution. As Jeffrie Murphy argues,
What is needed, in order to reconcile my undesired suffering of
punishment at the hands of the state with my autonomy (and thus with the
state’s right to punish me), is a political theory which makes the state’s
decision to punish me in some sense my own decision. If I have willed my
own punishment (consented to it, agreed to it) then— even if at the time I
happen not to desire it—it can be said that my autonomy and dignity
remain intact.278
As we will see, sophisticated attempts to legitimize state punishment in a liberal
state appear to presuppose that a democratic legislature is the institution that is
determining what conduct is to be criminalized. Consent-based theories of state
punishment, then, should be viewed as precluding a regime of administrative crimes.
Liberal theories of punishment have deep historical roots.279 The famous
social contract theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote, “[I]t is in order not to be the
victim of a murderer that a person consents to die if he becomes one.”280 Influenced
by Rousseau,281 Italian criminal law theorist Cesare Beccaria similarly argued that
“[i]t was thus necessity that compelled men to give up part of their personal liberty
[to the state] . . . [and] [t]he aggregate of these smallest possible portions constitutes
the right to punish.”282 Immanuel Kant—the thinker so influential in the retributive
punishment theory that flourished in philosophy departments—also presents a
political, contractarian theory. As Guyora Binder summarizes, for Kant “the tension
between law and the moral autonomy of those subject to it frames the problem of
justice, or legitimate coercion,” and “Kant’s solution to this paradox is a social
277. Per Ristroph, “Some form of consent [is] widely viewed as the “gold standard” for political
legitimacy, [and] is posited as a necessary condition for political legitimacy.” Id.
278. Murphy, supra note 272, at 224; see also Dubber, supra note 179, at 2598 (“One answer to
this question-and at any rate the one I am interested in exploring here proceeds from the claim that the
fundamental principle of legitimacy in the modem state is autonomy, or self-government. So, quite
simply, punishment is legitimate if and only if it is consistent with the principle of autonomy. Put
another way, punishment is legitimate if and only if it is self-punishment.”); Finkelstein, supra note 273
(“The high justificatory hurdle for our practices of punishment provides a reason to return to the
forgotten contractarian approach to punishment: If it is easier to justify the enforcement of voluntary
arrangements than involuntary ones, a theory of punishment that convincingly predicates a consensual
foundation for the institution should depict the institution as easier to justify than other types
of theories.”).
279. Finkelstein, a “modern” contract theorist, makes the following historical
observation: “First, there is a robust contractarian tradition that emerged in seventeenth century
political philosophy, first with the writings of Thomas Hobbes, later in the Enlightenment version of
this same tradition in the writings of Locke and Rousseau, and finally in a Kantian version of the
tradition, as developed by John Rawls.” Finkelstein, supra note 273, at 322.
280. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 64 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith
R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762) (Richard Dagger unearthed this intriguing line).
281. Binder, supra note 178, at 334–35 (linking Rousseau and Beccaria).
282. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 12 (Aaron Thomas ed., Aaron
Thomas & Jeremy Parzen, trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 2008) (1764).
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contract, modeled on Rousseau’s, in which society’s members freely subject
themselves to law.”283
Modern consent-based theories add sophistication to older “social contract”
thought experiments. Most important are the theories that build on the work of
liberal philosopher John Rawls,284 applying his framework to the issue of state
punishment. Rawls’s solution to the legitimacy problem noted above was to posit a
“counterfactual” pre-political agreement of free individuals to submit themselves to
political society and the coercion of law.285 This was famously called the “original
position,” in which people were behind a “veil of ignorance” about what type of life
they would be born into; Rawls argued that reasonable people would all agree on
certain principles of justice that would in turn be implemented into law.286 The
original position solves the legitimacy dilemma in the same way that the historical
theories of social contract solved it—by hypothesizing a pre-political consent to
political institutions. The coercion of contemporary law is theoretically consented
to by the reasonable citizen in the original position, even if you do not consent to
this or that specific law.287
283. Binder, supra note 178, at 352–53.
284. I say “build on” because Rawls’s seminal works did not present a fully fleshed out theory
of punishment. See Chad Flanders, Criminals Behind the Veil: Political Philosophy and Punishment, 31
BYU J. PUB. L. 83 (2016) (describing difficulties in reconciling Rawls’s statements about punishment
with his statements about distributive justice). Rawls did weigh in on the debates taking place in the
1950s regarding retributivism and deterrence, and he advocated for a rule-utilitarianism. John Rawls,
Two Concepts of Rules, 44 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
285. Melissaris, supra note 182, at 125.
286. Dagger, supra note 275, at 344. The world “reasonable” is significant here. There is a debate
amongst consent-based punishment theorists as to whether the people reasoning before they agree to
the social contract are merely “rational agents” concerned with self-interest (“contractarians”) or are
“reasonable citizens” who are concerned about other people and “committed to fair cooperation.”
Id. at 344–57. In this section I consciously adopt the latter conception of the liberal individual, as it is
not clear to me that rational agents would necessarily demand democratic institutions. Tellingly, Dagger
traces the rational-agent liberals back to Hobbes, the famous theorist of centralized power, and the
reasonable-citizen liberals back to Rousseau—a famous democrat. Id. at 345. For a sophisticated
presentation of the rational-agent theory not presented here, see Finkelstein, supra note 273, at 314–31.
I must also bracket off a third variant of contractarian thought—“fair play” accounts. Zachary Hoskins,
Fair Play, Political Obligation, and Punishment, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 53 (2011) (describing “the fair play
view, according to which punishment’s permissibility derives from reciprocal obligations shared by
members of a political community, understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative venture. Most fair
play views portray punishment as an appropriate means of removing the unfair advantage an offender
gains relative to law-abiding members of the community.”). Like the rational-agent theories above, a
fair play account of liberal punishment does not clearly imply a demand for a democratic legislature to
determine what conduct is criminal. It is conceivable that conduct creating an “unfair advantage” is
conduct that can be determined by some sort of agency or bureau. For a very recent variant of a “fair
play” theory that suggests this, see generally CHIAO, supra note 275. Chiao’s theory imposes a
requirement of “equal opportunity for influence” in the content of the criminal law but notes that this
principle “could be consistent with both popular and bureaucratic models of oversight over criminal
justice.” Id. at 78–79. Chiao’s monograph was published during the editing process of this Article, and
therefore I must leave it to later work to respond in full to his important new insights.
287. Importantly, most theorists do not view state punishment as legitimate because the
offender has somehow forfeited his rights to be free from coercion due to the commission of his
offense—thus putting himself outside of the protections of society. This argument was perhaps most
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Theorists have applied this reasoning to argue that state punishment retains
its legitimacy, or can at least be tested for legitimacy, by how well it lives up to or
fails to live up to Rawlsian principles.288 Corey Brettschneider cites to Rawls’s
“liberal principle of legitimacy,” that “exercise of political power is fully proper only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of the
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”289 This principle
of reasonable endorsement by free and equal citizens is, according to
Brettschneider, the same principle that can “justify[ ] political coercion to those who
are guilty of crimes” and that indeed this justification of criminal punishment is
“central” to the legitimacy principle.290 For Brettschneider, Rawlsian theory
provides a litmus test for the legitimacy of various punishment practices by
the state:
Crucial here is the question of whether a particular criminal sanction
respects each individual’s status as a free and equal citizen . . . . At the same
time, however, a legitimate polity will employ legal constraints in the form
of criminal law to curb destructive or antisocial behavior, so that some
citizens do not violate others’ basic interests, such as security.291
Criminal punishment, through Rawlsian theory, then, is the modern
explanation for Rousseau’s cryptic remark about the murderer consenting to his

famously advanced by John Locke in his Second Treatise: “[A] criminal . . . hath, by the unjust violence
and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be
destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor
security.” JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (Prentice Hall Inc. 1997) (1690);
Christopher W. Morris, Punishment and Loss of Moral Standing, 21 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 53, 53–54 (1991)
(advancing similar argument). This “forfeiture” account is rightly rejected by most, as it cannot explain
why even clearly guilty offenders—say, those who confess and provide video proof, and then ask for
punishment—nevertheless deserve the procedural protections normally accorded to defendants. See
Dagger, supra note 275, at 349 (discussing objections to forfeiture account); Finkelstein, supra note 273,
at 218 (same).
288. Rawls’s theory is avowedly an “ideal theory” in which “[e]veryone is presumed to act justly
and to do his part in upholding just institutions.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (Harvard
Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999). This would preclude the need for criminal sanctions, as all would obey legal
obligations (he called this “strict compliance”). Rawls did not necessarily view his theory as being
applicable to a society where people routinely disobey legal duties—this was what he called a society of
“partial compliance,” and in such a society it was not enough to consider the requirements of justice, but
also to consider “the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
For a comprehensive discussion of how Rawlsian theory is nevertheless relevant to the question of state
punishment, see generally Dolovich, supra note 263, at 307. See also Melissaris, supra note 182, at 131
(“As Rawls admits, a theory of justice must be adjustable to nonideal conditions of partial compliance.
This is not to say that state punishment is rendered morally or otherwise necessary or a priori. The fact,
however, that it is a practice so central in modern states and that it is a prima facie way of dealing with
partial compliance means that it must be tackled and put in the right perspective. And this must be
done coherently in a way that does not undermine the foundations of the whole edifice.”).
289. Brettschneider, supra note 274 (“I draw in particular on Rawls’s ‘liberal principle
of legitimacy.’”).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 177.
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own execution. “If those who have committed crimes were to think of themselves
as citizens who accept others’ status as free and equal and were motivated to reach
universal agreement,” Brettschneider asks, “which punishments could they or could
they not reasonably accept?”292
Sharon Dolovich similarly rests her argument on the Rawlsian framework. “If
the exercise of state power in a liberal democracy is to be legitimate,” she writes “it
must be justifiable in terms that all members of society subject to that power would
accept as just and fair,” and “[t]his imperative is particularly acute in the context of
criminal punishment.”293 The traditional problem for consent-based theories of
punishment is that it seems fanciful that any criminal would willingly submit to hard
treatment, but Rawls’s Veil of Ignorance allows for a theory of such consent by
“abstracting consideration of the particular details of . . . individual lives.”294
Legitimate state punishment is that which is “exercised on the basis of a collective
agreement” that “we would all accept as just and fair if we were to find ourselves
behind a veil of ignorance.”295
Crucial for the issue of administrative crimes is that mainstream liberal theory
presupposes that those in the Original Position would agree that a democratically
elected legislature is a requirement of the liberal principle of legitimacy. While the
connection between liberalism and democracy is a complicated one, most liberal
theorists today analyze the concepts in tandem.296 As Rawls argued in Political
Liberalism, “citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in
a system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one
another fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider the most
reasonable conception of political justice.”297 This mutual recognition of freedom
and equality—this reciprocity—leads to requirements for institutional structure.
Reasonable citizens considering the reciprocal status of their co-citizens in a
cooperative system would not prevent their co-citizens from having political power.
“[E]qual political liberty” writes Amy Gutman, “entails the right of adult members
of a society to share as free and equal individuals in making mutually binding
decisions about their collective life.”298
This is made more explicit when Rawls discusses his “four-stage sequence”
for determining the principles of justice and applying them in an actual society: (1)
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 186.
Dolovich, supra note 263, at 314.
Id.
Id. at 315.
See Amy Gutmann, Rawls on the Relationship Between Liberalism and Democracy, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS (Samuel Freeman ed., 2006); John Rawls, The Idea of Public
Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 769–70 (1997) (“The idea of public reason arises from a
conception of democratic citizenship in a constitutional democracy . . . . [I]t is a relation of free and
equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a collective body.”). See also John Skorupski,
Rawls, Liberalism, and Democracy, 128 ETHICS 173 (2017) (comparing “new” mainstream liberal
democratic theory with “old” liberalism not inherently tethered to democracy).
297. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 446.
298. Gutmann, supra note 296, at 173; see also Rawls, supra note 296, at 769–71.
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the Original Position (discussed earlier), which is in turn implemented in terms of
fundamental political-institutional arrangement during the (2) “constitutional
convention,”299 after which comes (3) the legislative stage where, as Dolovich puts it,
citizens “identify and enact into law the policies that best realize the principles
previously selected.”300 Legislation is similar to the Original Position in that state
coercion is not directly assigned to individuals, but is instead abstracted (although
much less so). “At this stage, although the parties continue to deliberate behind the
veil, it is now thinner,” Dolovich argues, “allowing in the information about the
particulars of their own society necessary if the parties are to make informed
judgments, while at the same time still screening out the parties’ knowledge of their
attributes and personal particulars.”301 That the “parties” merely continue the prior
stages’ “deliberation” at the legislative stage implies that this legislature must be
democratic—it must allow for the inputs of all the free and equal citizens who took
part in the deliberation of the Original Position and the Constitutional Convention.
And it is here “at the legislative phase,” Dolovich concludes, “when the principles
of punishment are translated into actual policies.”302 What she almost certainly
means by “policies” here are rules of conduct and the punishments meted out for
their disobedience—criminal laws and sentencing laws.
That the legislative stage must be democratic is almost like stating a circular
proposition, and indeed some Rawlsian theorists appear to take for granted that
liberal punishment will also be democratic punishment. Brettschneider, for
example, does not appear to demand democratic institutions because of the
contractualist account of legitimacy; instead, the contractualist account of legitimacy
flows from a prior requirement of democracy.303 Emmanuel Melissaris makes this
point more directly, stating that while the paradox of state punishment of free
individuals disappears in the liberal Rawlsian solution, this requires that after the
agreement to the general scheme at the prior stages, “inclusive democratic political
institutions and decision-making procedures must be in place.”304
299. RAWLS, supra note 288, at 195–200.
300. Dolovich, supra note 263, at 423.
301. Id. “[This is what] Rawls terms [the] ‘the legislative stage,’ at which policy deliberations
take place behind what we can think of as a ‘modified veil.’” Id. at 421.
302. Id. at 402.
303. Brettschneider, supra note 274, at 179 (“Such an account of justification is inclusive in its
respect for all citizens’ status as free and equal and avoids the aristocratic or sectarian problems that
would arise from basing justification on one particular theory of general moral truth. In this sense, I
have argued elsewhere that contractualist justification is a democratic account of legitimacy.”) (citing
COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT (2007)).
304. Melissaris, supra note 182, at 142. It is worth noting that the conception of democracy
underlying these liberal theories of punishment is one that is different from the conception utilized in
the prior section discussing the expressive dimension of punishment. While the expressive theory
outlined above adopts a “majoritarian” or “popular sovereignty” conception of
democracy—demanding that “the views of the people who make up the political community are
reflected in their law,” Kleinfeld, supra note 235, at 1465—the theories discussed here are premised on
a conception of democracy that is defined by how well political institutions “advance[e] liberal values
(e.g., equality, liberty, individual rights).” Id. Given that these are “liberal” theories of punishment, this
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The implication for the status of administrative crimes becomes immediately
apparent under this framework: the offenses result in state punishment that has not
been consented to via a democratic criminalization institution, and they are
therefore illegitimate. The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy demands that legal
coercion only be employed on terms agreed to by reasonable citizens recognizing
each other as “free and equal in a system of social cooperation,”305 which implies,
as Gutman puts it, “equal political liberty” in a democratic political institution.306
This authority that flows from the reciprocal consent to political obligation ends
with the democratic institution; government agencies and bureaus not structured on
the premises of democratic decision making procedures cannot share in it. Free and
equal individuals would not, in the Original Position and the Constitutional
Convention, agree to punishment that is promulgated by administrative agencies on
the basis of their technical expertise. They would instead agree to criminalization at
the Legislative Stage. But one need not only look at the characteristics of the
Legislative Stage to know that administrative agencies have no role in it. The role of
agencies is made clearer by Rawls’s placement of “administrators” in the “fourth
stage” alongside judges.307 Agencies, like judges, apply the rules created at the
legislative stage to “particular cases.”308 Rule-application does not require the same

is unsurprising. Liberalism, not majoritarianism, is the central constellation of values to be advanced.
Thus, Dolovich rejects that “the legitimacy of [criminal] policies may simply be found in the political
process itself, and in particular in the status of legislators who wrote the laws as duly elected democratic
representatives.” Dolovich, supra note 263, at 312–13. Legitimacy cannot be equated with “democratic
majoritarianism,” she argues, because “there is nothing inherent in the majoritarian standard to ensure
that legislators even fairly consider the interests of all citizens subject to the laws they pass.” Id. A
majority might run roughshod over an unpopular minority, and the logic of majority voting does
nothing to prevent it. This is insufficient for a liberal theory, as the liberal principle of legitimacy
requires that political power be “exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse . . . .” Brettschneider, supra note 274.
A free and equal citizen would not endorse the unreasonable legislative oppression of his or her group
merely because a competing group managed to win fifty-one percent of the seats in the legislature. The
liberal conception of democracy requires that “all norms are to be determined through democratic
deliberation and decision-making and in light of public reason,” and therefore “all [must] be given the
opportunity to participate in political decision-making.” Melissaris, supra note 182, at 148. This is in
contrast to a “mere formalist majoritarianism.” Id.
305. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 446.
306. Gutmann, supra note 296, at 173.
307. RAWLS, supra note 14, at 199.
308. Id. Agency rulemaking (even noncriminal) may therefore be illegitimate altogether under
the Rawlsian framework. But see Dolovich, supra note 263, at 423 (“It is Rawls’s position that no limits
on self-knowledge are necessary at the final, adjudicative stage at which the policies and laws enacted
by the legislature are to be applied. Yet any broad policies derived from the principles will necessarily
remain at some level of abstraction, and will continue to require judgments and assessments of the
available evidence if decisions are to be reached. Thus here too, it seems to me, decision makers will
continue to be susceptible to the corrupting effects of the knowledge of their personal particulars that
Rawls is so concerned to purge from the deliberations at prior stages. For this reason, I expect that
some modified veil of ignorance, at least for the decision maker, would also be required at the last stage,
in order to ensure that the policies chosen at the third stage remain as true in their implementation as
the process of deriving the principles on which they were based.”).
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degree of democratic input over decision-making as does application which—at
least in determinate cases—involves no need for value judgments.
CONCLUSION
The application of the nondelegation doctrine to criminal law is effectively a
test of the extent to which criminal law’s “legality principle” has purchase in current
law. While the Supreme Court and many state high courts have carved out a place
for non-legislative criminalization when that criminalization is delegated to
administrative agencies, this consensus should be questioned. Criminal law
expresses the condemnation of the community and therefore must originate from
the community. Similarly, criminal punishment coerces through liberty deprivation
and therefore must be legitimized through citizen consent. Both expressivist and
liberal theories of punishment, then, demand that criminalization be democratic.
While the claim of this Article is that administrative crimes suffer from a legitimacy
deficit as a matter of political theory, this is potentially relevant to constitutional law
if in a future case the nature of the delegated power is taken into consideration. This
argument, if accepted, would not lead to the death of the administrative state—it
would merely confine agencies to the use of civil sanctions.

